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Bravo's Fallout: International Law and Nuclear Pollution in the Pacific
I. INTRODUCTION
Modern developments in international law could be described with
great oversimplification as following a pattern. A few major powers
develop norms of international law, most of which appear on their face
to be morally justifiable. A few such norms. howver. are developed to
ease or justify the exploitation of weaker. less developed states and ter-
ritories. Even apparently equitable norms are sometimes twisted to
serve this goal. As less developed areas gain increasing independence
and political power, they tend to reject many of the old norms and seek
to influence the development of a new body of international law.
Many of the changes suggested by these new participants in the inter-
national arena represent attempts to safeguard their own important and
legitimate interests. Some are eflorts to establish standards which will
protect the interests of all mankind. Some may be reflex reaction.,
against anything that can be associated with former colonial
exploitation.
This paper attempts to illustrate how the process described above has
been unfolding in the Pacific in the development of international law
regarding nuclear pollution. In the late 1940's and the 1950's. when tile
United States developed norms of international law which were used to
justify atmospheric and surface nuclear testing in the Pacific. islanders
were unable to protect themselves against this threat to their health and
their resources. In the 1960's and early 1970's. when France relied in
part upon the old American arguments to justify its above-ground nu-
clear tests in Polynesia. Pacific nations and territories were able to
counter with legal maneuvers and protests that eventually helped force
the French tests underground. More recently, a combination of Pacific
microstates and territories was able to pressure Japan into abandoning
plans to dump nuclear wastes in the Pacific. In doing so, they may
have prevented larger powers from establishing a legal regime whici
would have sanctioned ocean dumping of nuclear wastes.
Pacific islanders have been in the forefront of efforts to develop a
new international legal perspective regarding nuclear activity, and they
will probably continue to be active in future disputes involving nuclear
uses of the ocean. These issues are of paramount importance to Pacific
1
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islanders because American weapons tests have made them well aware
of the dangers of nuclear pollution. Nuclear radiation can cause ge-
netic damage. cancer, other health problems. and. of course, death.
Some of these symptoms do not develop until several years after expo-
sure. Nuclear pollution of the ocean enters the sea's food chain-and
the final consumers at the end of the chain are often human. It is not
certain just what levels of radiation, and therefore what amounts or
forms of nuclear pollution, are **safe." The amount of radiation expo-
sure considered safe is continually being lowered as more is learned
about its effects.' One commentator has stated. "Even though effects of
radiation exposure have been studied more extensively than those of
any other environmental pollutant. the only definitive finding so far
appears to be that no absolutely safe level of radioactivity can be as-
serted." 2  Even a -safe- level of ocean pollution would be added to
other sources of radiation that humans are exposed to, such as x-rays
and background radiation. It is not always possible to tell just what
..safe" straw will break a camel's back. Pacific islanders have already
had many straws, some quite unsafe, placed on their backs. They are
reluctant to accept any more.
I. NUCLEAR WEAPONS T.STS IN THE PACIFIC'
A. American Tesis in ie Marshall Islandr
Between 1946 and 1958. the United States conducted sixty-six atmos-
pheric. surface, and underwater nuclear weapons tests on and in the
vicinity of Enewetak and Bikini Atolls. These atolls are located in the
Marshall Islands. which are part of the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands. a joint United States-United Nations strategic trust adminis-
tered by the United States.' Before the first tests, the United States es-
I G Johnson. Radatian anS fleath. Ni ' Pt IThe New Pactficl. Nov-l)ec. 19510. at 33.
/am utt I S Role in Cancers. ('hi. Tribune. April 5. 1979. at I. col. I. K. col 2 Ihereinalter
iLted .as .am tU11 [
2 Comment. Ml'ernatonal h a. and Radatclr" Poltlion br Oearn Dumping. i'th .411
'heir (;Ge'niu and IfVh .411 Their SAtW. I I S, % Dni (.o L. Ri v 757. 758-59 t 1l4741.
3 Because this paper is concerned with the reactions of Pacific islanders to nuclear
-cliitie%. and the ffiect of those reactions on international law. the discussion in this section %ill
be limited to U S and French tests in the Pacific. Testing by the U S.. USSR. and other nation% in
their own territorv will not be discussed. The British tests in the Pacific in the 1951's will not he
dicusscd, as they had much less of an impact on attitudes and law than the concurrent, more
numerous U.S. tests. The effects of U.S. tests upon American servicemen in the Pacific are also
outside the scope of this paper.
4 The Trust Territorv (T.T.I. also known as Micronesia. consists of over 2.XMJ islinds I.es
than i(K0 are inhabited. It is located in the western Pacitfic just north of the equator. The island%
hjie been a Spanish colony, a German colony, and a Japanese League of Nations mandate. In
the current trusteeship. the United States has full administrative powers and the United Nations
role is minimal. The T.T. has divided into Ibur cparate political entities recently in anticipation
of the end of the Trusteeship Three -the Federated States of Micronesia FSM . the Republic of
2
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tablished a 180.000 square mile -danger zone" from which ships and
planes were banned. This zone grew to 400.000 square miles in 1954
when "Bravo.- the first hydrogen bomb ever tested, was detonated on
Bikini on March 1. Nearby inhabited atolls were showered with radio-
active fallout from this test. Japanese fishermen just outside the danger
zone were exposed to Bravo's fallout: all required medical treatment
and one died. In 1958 President Eisenhower suspended United States
testing. When testing resumed, thirty-seven additional tests were con-
ducted outside the Trust Territory at Christmas and Johnston Islands.
These tests required a danger zone of 1.2 million square miles on the
ocean surface and 2 million square miles in the airspace above.
These tests quickly provoked a debate as to their legality. Dr. Eman-
ual Margolis. a member of the American Society of International Law,
was one of the first to voice his opposition to the tests. He claimed that
the danger zone was an illegal exercise of state sovereignty over the
high seas. interfering with customary freedoms of fishing, navigation.
and aerial movement.- He cited the Trail Stnelter' case to illustrate
that. under international law. no state has the right to use its territory in
such a manner as to cause the pollution of the territory of other state.
when the pollution is of serious magnitude." He then discussed United
States cases which had held that a state can be enjoined from activities
which pollute interstate waters if the pollution is of a serious magni-
tude.' Margolis then turned to article 73 of the United Nations Char-
ter. which requires that states administering non-self-governing
territories accept as a sacred trust the obligations to promote the well-
lldau tPalaut. and the NtarshAll Island% -% ill probably become independent nation, in "Iree ts.-
sooition" % ith the United States The fourth, the Commonwealth of the Northern Martina.. A ill
become a U S commonwealth All four entities have recently formed dentocraticalls elected go.-
erinient', which currentl coexist with the territorial administration. S'.cener/ll Arill.,trong.
he Ltne ven e t.f the .11t"termtan.s ito the International C'omniuntiv: .4 Studi ol'the (re'at'n 1!/ l
e'h Inen,nanal Enti . 5 BKitoiLLY. J 1.li. L 207 (1979): ('lark. Se.:m)'t,.r1ntntg ,and tr/ee
4itswtutton-S'hould the U'nied.Vattons Terminate ihe Pactfic Iilandr rru.st'. 21 II , 1%1'i I. J I
5 %jrgolh. 'he lldr.iyn Boobt E ftpmnl.r and International Lw. 64 YA1 i L J. b24. 31.
6 rrail Smelter Case (United States ". Canada). Arbitral Tribunal. 1941. 3 R Int'l Arb
A*ards 1905 11949)). The case involved a smecr in Canada which emittcd sulphur dioxide over
the state of Washington The tribunal held that under principles of international la,% no state has
the right to use or permit the use of its territory in such a manner as to cause injur) by fume, in or
to the territorN of another state. or to persons therein, when the in jur) is of serious consequence
and is established by clear and convincing evidence. The tribunal applied this principle to hold
that the Smelter uould be required to refrain from causing further damages through border-cross-
ing pollution. It further held that Canada would pay damages to be agreed upon by the tuo
gosernments. such damages to be equivalent to those recoverable under the decisions of U S
courts in suits bcl'ccn private individuals.
7 Margolis. mpt[,a note 5. at 642.
_ Id. New Jcrses v. Cit, of New York. 283 U.S. 473 (1931). Ne'%. York v New Jerse%. 250
US 296 11921)
3
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being of the inhabitants of these territories, ensure their just treatment.
and protect them against abuses.' He also cited the Trusteeship Agree-
ment between the United States and the United Nations for Microne-
sia.' ° Article 6 of the Agreement requires that the United States protect
the land, resources, and health of the territory's inhabitants.
Margolis closed with moral arguments. He claimed it would be diffi-
cult to convince other governments of United States moral superiority
over the Soviets if the United States had "unclean hands." ' He recom-
mended that the tests be shifted to the continental United States or
Alaska. saying, "'If we are not prepared to expose oursel/es to these
hazards. aforiori we have no ight to expose other people to them in
order to protect our citizens. Both morals and logic dictate that the risk
of thermonuclear tests should be born by the state benefiting from
them."' 2
The leading proponents of the legality of United States testing were
Myres S. McDougal. Professor of Law at Yale Law School. and Nor-
bert A. Schlei. a member of the editorial board of Yale Law Journel. In
an oft-cited article, they denounced criticisms of the tests as "invective"
and "spurious legalisms,"' 3 while calling critics imperceptive.' 4 Their
contentions rested upon a series of balancing tests used to determine
reasonableness, a series in which security interests knocked down one
apparent straw man after another. Balancing security against interfer-
ence with navigation and air traffic, they noted that freedom of the seas
has traditionally yielded to naval maneuvers.'" While admitting that
over 100 tons of fish were condemned in Japan because of high levels
of radio-activity, and that fish prices fell 50% in Japan after the tests.
they cited a variety of statistics to show that the harm to the worldwide
fishing industry was minor, and suggested that fishermen simply go
elsewhere.' " They criticized the suggestion that the tests be conducted
inside the United States, indicating that there is no suitable site. 7 They
9 Margolis. rupra note 5. at 644
1ii Id at 645. referring to Trusteeship Agreement for the Iormer Japancse Mandatcd I-
land., approved by the United Nations Security Council. Apr. 2. 1947. and by the United States.
Jul-, 18. 1947. 61 Stat. 3301. T.I.A.S. No. 1665. 8 U.N.T.S. 189 Ihereinafter cited as 7Thifeehp
AgreemenI. The Trsteerhip 4greement created the current Trusteeship. in effect providing inter-
naional recognition of U.S. control in Micronesia in exchange for a UN advisory role. Veegener-
alls Comment. International Law and Dependent Territories: The Case of 3tironeria. 51) Ti MI'.
L.Q 58. 71-75 (1971).
I I. Margolis. supra note 5. at 646.
12 Id at 647.
13. McDougal & Schlei. The Hdrogen Bomb Tests in Perspeclre: l.afui .1easurerfor e.
rurtIr. 64 YLi L.J. 648. 649 (1955).
14. Id at 695.
15 Id at 675.
lb Id at 694.
17. Id at 708 n.321. This would appear to be both an acknowledgement of the risks McI)ou-
gal and Schici minimized elsewhere and a cnticism of tests which did take place in the L1 S.
4
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disposed of Trail Smelier by noting that it did not involve security
issues."
McDougal and Schlei's handling of the United Nations Charter and
the Trusteeship Agreement is most interesting. As the Charter does not
preclude self-defense, they determined that it permits anticipatory self-
defense.' They noted that the Trusteeship Agreement gave the United
States virtually unrestricted powers in matters relating to security.-"
and concluded that security was the main purpose of the Agreement. -'
Therefore. any duties the Agreement imposed upon the United States
regarding Trust Territory inhabitants are not -unqualified impera-
tives,"-- but instead are to be subordinated to any United States secur-
ity interests.2-
McDougal and Schlei have provoked a great deal of comment. some
of it based on information which became available after their work was
published. Howard J. Taubenfield. a Visiting Research Scholar at the
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, acknowledged that ju.st
because one may be liable for damages, one may still, under certain
circumstances. be legally able to engage in the activity causing pollu-
tion. However. he noted that cases following this principle did not in-
volve the -right to kill or maim."- ' While admitting that in the
international arena any balancing of interests must take account of se-
curity. he commented that "as Hitler demonstrated, the demand for
.security' may serve only to conceal rapacity and indifference to human
suffering."2 J.W.L. Swan. Lecturer in Law at the University of Mel-
bourne. stated that while there is a custom of naval maneuvers, there is
no custom of nuclear danger zones. -' A.G. Mercer, a member of the
faculty of law at Victoria University of Wellington. noted that the du-
ration and effects of nuclear tests far exceed those of naval maneu-
vers.2' On the other hand. Mercer stated that Trail Sine/ter developed
norms for liability, not for the prohibition of prospectively harmful
IS Id at 6,X)
19 id at b7 One problem sAith this approach is that an act of aggression could be labeled
"anticipatory %elf-defen, ""
24) Id at 699 See Trusteeshtp .crrement..upra note 10. ans 3. 5
21 Mct)ougal and Schlet. 3upra note 13. at 703.
22 Id at 705.
23. One might be reluctant to contract to sell a car to %omeone who agreed with this ap-
proach By application of analogous reasoning. it could be determined that the main purpose of
the contraLt was to provide the buyer with transportation Once this purpose was achicsed. the
buyer could determine that any remaining provisions relating to payment are not unqualified
imperatives. and can therefore be disregarded.
24 Taubnfeld. Nuclear Testmng and Iniernatonal Law. 16 Su. L .. 365. 404 (1962).
25 Id at 405.
26. ('omment..4n Ftplriiste i.ue n internalional laK-" he French .vuclear Trr.r. 9 Melb
U L Rev. 296. 3YX (1973-74) [hereinafter cited as Comment. Etpliptie li.ruel
27. Mercer. Internatnal Law'andthe French Nuclear Te.ii.t. 1968 N.Z.L J 405. 407 (Sept. 17.
1969).
5
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activity.- '8
Peter J. Fleiss. a Professor of Government at Louisiana State Univer-
sity, commented that McDougal and Schlei "would stretch the right of
self-defense of the United States in relation to nuclear testing to the
point of eliminating most restraint, and one may very well wonder
whether there remains any law at all if such permissive interpretations
are countenanced." 29  He discussed the possibility that the tests could
conflict with customary law developed from the Nuremberg Trials, the
Genocide Convention. the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, and
the Geneva Protocol on Poisonous Gases and Analogous Materials of
1925.30 However, he also suggested that current international law of
peace and international law of war are inadequate in a cold war situa-
tion, and proposed a new law of cold war under which nuclear testing
would apparently be legal.3' This proposal was based on his assump-
tion that "there is little chance for test and armament bans."32  This
assumption was proven wrong by the Test Ban Treaty. --
Nucleartests were criticized by the Asian-African Legal Consultive
Committee. an advisory body of legal experts formed by the govern-
28 Mercer. Internationai Law and the French .Vuclear Tests. 1968 N.Z.L.J. 418. 419 (Oct. I.
196b8)
2Q Fless. Trhe L.eeah of.4tmospheric .rue/ear Tests-4 Critical View of International Law in
the ('old iar. 15 U. FLA. L. REv. 21. 24 (1962).
30 Id at 25-26. The Nuremberg Trials after World War i involved Nazi officials charged
with crimes against peace. war crimes, and crimes against humanity. Crimes against humanity
included murder. extermination. enslavement. deportation. and other inhumane acts committed
against any civilian population. before or during the war.
The Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide of December 9.
1948. 78 U.N.T.S. 277. includes in its article 2 definition of genocide acts committed with intent to
kill members of a group. cause serious bodily harm to members of a group. inflict on a group
conditions calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in pan. or prevent births
in a group The U.S. is not a party to this Convention.
The lague Declaration on Asphyxiating Gases of July 29. 1899 prohibits the use of projectiles.
the sole object of which is the diffusion of asphyxiating or deleterious gases. The U.S. is not a
party to this treaty.
Article 23(e) of the Hague Regulations on Land Warfare of 1907 prohibits the use of arms.
projectiles. or materials calculated to cause unnecessary suffering.
The Geneva Protocol of June 17. 1925 prohibits the use of asphyxiating. poisonous. and other
gases. and all analogous liquids, materials, and devices, and bacteriological methods of warfare.
The U.S. s not a party to this treaty.
For a more in-depth discussion of the applicability of these sources of international law to
nuclear weapons. see G. SCHWARZENDERGER. THE LEGALITY OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS (1958):
Meyrowitz. The Status of Nuclear Weapons Under International Law. 38 GUILD PRAC. 65 (1981).
The theory that these sources point towards norms of customary international law which would
prohibit above-ground nuclear testing is based in part on two assumptions. The first is that nu-
clear radiation is similar to the poisonous gases prohibited by some of the above treaties, and
perhaps an analogous material under the Geneva Protocol. The second is that if certain acts are
so inhumane that they are illegal during warfare, then they must also be illegal during peacetime.
3 1. Fleiss. rupra note 29. at 27-32.
32. Id at 32.
33 Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere. in Outer Space. and Under
Water of August 5. 1963. 14 U.S.T. 1313. 480 U N.T.S. 43.
6
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ments of several Asian, African, and Middle Eastern countries. Their
1963 report. which did not include underground tests, reached the fol-
lowing conclusions:
I) Every test results in or is capable of resulting in immediate or
delayed widespread damage.
2) The present state of scientific knowledge does not indicate that
harmful effects of tests can reasonably be eliminated.
3) Because of the above conclusions, nuclear tests are international
wrongs. even if carried out in a nation's own territory, and can be
regarded as an abuse of right.
4) A state carrying out tests is absolutely liable for damage caused by
such tests.
5) Nuclear testing is contrary to principles in the U.N. Charter's Dec-
laration of Human Rights.
6. Tests carried out in the high seas and the airspace above them vio-
late freedom of the seas and freedom of flying above the high seas.
7) Tests carried out in trust territories and non-self-governing territo-
ries violate articles 73 and 74 of the U.N. Charter. 4
In a non-legal work about the Japanese fishermen exposed to Bravo's
fallout, author Ralph E. Lapp provided an answer to McDougal and
Schlei's claim that the Bravo test had a de minimis effect on fishing and
was therefore reasonable. After documenting the Japanese reaction to
fish contamination. Lapp noted that fish is the major source of protein
in the Japanese diet." Lapp asked what the reaction would be if the
shoe were on the other foot-if American beef were contaminated, and
United States supermarkets and butcher shops had to keep on hand
what had been a required utensil in Japanese fish markets, a geiger
counter.-" American consumers would probably not find this "reason-
able." even if it could be shown that their plight was not having an
overwhelming effect on the beef industry worldwide. Lapp also noted
that high levels of radioactivity were found in fish taken over more
than a one million square mile area in the Pacific three months after
the Bravo test." This statistic provides little support for McDougal
and Schlei's "let them fish elsewhere" approach.
McDougal and Schlei's unqualified support of atmospheric nuclear
testing was not even embraced by one of this century's master balanc-
ers, Henry Kissinger, a man whose sympathy for Micronesia was alleg-
edly displayed in the statement, "There are only 90,000 people out
34. ASIAN-AI-RICAN LEGAL CONSULTIVE COMMITrEE TIlE LEGALITY OP NUCLEAR Tists
(RI PORT OP TIHF COMMITEE AND BACKGROUND MATERIALS) 244-45 (1963).
35 R LAPP. Tilt; VOYAGE OF TIlE LUCKY DRAGON 120 (1957).
36. Id at 128.
37 Ad at 179
7
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there. Who gives a damn?"13 1 In a 1958 article, Kissinger described the
cold war situation, the Soviet threat, and the need for continued devel-
opment of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, he concluded that the
United States. the USSR, and their allies should seek to immediately
reduce the amount of fallout released into the atmosphere by nuclear
tests, and completely eliminate atmospheric fallout within two years.
He supported further nuclear testing, so long as it was limited to under-
ground tests and surface tests of hypothetical clean weapons.
3.
Some federal courts in the United States have had the opportunity to
examine issues related to nuclear testing in the Marshalls. In Pauling I-.
McEIrov. " a group of Americans, Marshall Islanders, and others
broughi suit in the D.C. Circuit Court to enjoin the Commissioners of
the Atomic Energy Commission and the Secretary of Defense from det-
onating nuclear weapons in the Marshall Islands. The court denied
their motion for a preliminary injunction and dismissed their com-
plaint. The court stated that the plaintiffs failed to show "that the con-
sideration of possible deleterious effects claimed by plaintiffs to result
from such tests outweigh the public interest involved in the develop-
ment of nuclear weapons through these tests in furtherance of the na-
tional defense and safety."" It added that the United Nations Charter.
Trusteeship Agreement. and principle of freedom of the high seas are
not self-executing. and did not vest any of the plaintiffs with individual
legal rights.4 2 Finally, the court determined that United States legisla-
tion authorizing the tests did not conflict with "the so-called human
rights provisions of the Charter of the United Nations," the Trusteeship
Agreement, or freedom of the seas. Even if it did, the United States
statute would be paramount to any such conflicting provisions.
43
On narrow legal grounds, the Pauling court may have been correct
on some issues. Even though some scientists attempted to inform the
United States government about the harmful effects the tests were hav-
ing on the environment, perhaps worldwide, the government remained.
for official purposes, unaware of any such problems." Many of the
harmful effects the testing had on the Marshallese did not become evi-
38. D. M'HE.NRY. MICRONESIA TRUST BETRAYED 87 (1975): Tiffin. Producer. Who Gires a
Damn.'. 60 Mi.-uTES. Dec. 23. 1979. at I. 2. 5 (transcript).
39 Ksinger. Nuclear Testing and the Problem of Peace. 37 FOR.I.;UN AF-. I (1958).
40. 164 F. Supp. 390 (D.D.C. 1958). aI'd. 278 F.2d 252 (D.C. Cir. 1960).
41. 164 F. Supp. at 392.
42. Id at 393.
43. Id
44 Eg.. ff. WASSLRM.N & N. SOLOMoN. KILLING OUR OwN 92-101 (1982): Danger o/F./-
out Satd Knomn. Durham Sun. October 15. 1982. at 2. col. 5. See also Lawsuits. supra note I. at 8.
col. 2. ("DOE officials... said that the 1950's was the time of the Cold War when politicians fell
we were in a nuclear weapons race with the Soviet Union. Scientists. living in that climate of fear.
were prone to minimize hazards of radiation ....- ).
..,W,..
8
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dent until years after the decision. Those Marshallese who had been
directly harmed by the tests were being kept on remote islands where
they had no access to the court, and from the language in the opinion it
appears doubtful that the government informed the court of the details
of their plight.
Although the cessation of testing in the Marshalls guaranteed that
the Pauling issues would not be relitigated, two more recent decisions
dealing with related issues indicate that courts further removed from
cold war passions might have decided that case differently. In People of
Saipan r. United States Department of Interior," the plaintiffs sought to
enjoin the construction of a hotel in Saipan, in the Trust Territory, un-
til the environmental impact of the proposed construction had been
studied and evaluated. They relied in part upon the previously men-
tioned provisions of the Trusteeship Agreement which require that the
United States protect Trust Territory inhabitants against the loss of
their land and resources. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held,
"[The Trusteeship Agreement can be a source of rights enforceable by
an individual litigant. . . . Th~e preponderance of features in the Trus-
teeship Agreement suggests the intention to establish direct. affirma-
tive. and judicially enforceable rights."'4
In People of Enewetak i. Laird.4 ' the District Court of Hawaii
granted a preliminary injunction under the National Environmental
Policy Act to stop simulated nuclear blasts on Enewetak without ever
considering deference to security interests. The central issue in the
case-the applicability of NEPA to the Trust Territory-bears little re-
lationship to the issues in Pauling. Nevertheless, the Enewetak court
had to resolve jurisidictional and standing issues in the plaintiffs' favor
in order to issue the injunction. The Pauling court would probably
have discussed security needs and then used these loopholes to dismiss
the case.
In short, in a case that arose not long after the publication of the
McDougal-Schlei article, their theories were followed, albeit without
citation. More recently, the Saipan court has explicitly rejected their
disregard for Micronesian rights under the Trusteeship Agreement.
The Enewetak court, by omission, implicitly rejected their apparent be-
lief that security interests will win any balancing test against environ-
mental interests and Micronesian rights.
The final decision in any legal dispute depends not only on legal
theories, but also upon the facts of the case. While McDougal and
Schlei denigrated the importance of article 6 of the Trusteeship Agree-
45 502 F.2t1 90 (9th Cir. 1974). ceri, denied. 420 U.S. 1003 (1975).
46 502 F.2d at 97.
47 353 F. Supp. 811 (D aiiwai 1973)
9
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ment. they claimed, "The duties to promote the welfare of the inhabit-
ants of the Trust Territory assumed by the United States in the Charter
and the Trusteeship Agreement. including the duty to protect the in-
habitants' land and resources, appear to have been performed in an
exemplary manner. " While admitting that 82 Marshallese, as well as
some Americans and Japanese. suffered "minor injuries."' + they con-
tended that the total inconvenience suffered by Marshallese as a result
of nuclear tests was less than they would have been subjected to if the
United States had constructed an airfield on one of their more heavily
populated islands5" Most of the legal scholars discussed above accept
this version of the facts, and many direct more discussion to the possi-
ble harm to fish than to actual harm to humans. The failure of most
legal scholars to consider the actual consequences of United States test-
ing in the Marshalls has probably influenced the opinions expressed in
their writings, and thereby may have had some influence on the devel-
opment of international law regarding nuclear pollution of the ocean.
The facts, as described in Pacific regional periodicals and other
sources, cast doubt upon contentions that the American nuclear tests
caused minimal harm and were therefore reasonable. Before the earli-
est tests in the Marshalls. which were of twenty kiloton bombs, the peo-
ple of Rongelap, 125 miles east of Bikini, were evacuated.5' When
Bravo, with its fifteen megaton yield, was tested, they were neither
evacuated nor warned to take any precautions. 2 Rongelap received a
one and one-half inch snowfall of radioactive ash from the test. -" As
this strange snow fell on the ground, on skin, on food. and into water
tanks, Rongelapese children played in it and tasted it. 4 The Ronge-
lapese continued to walk barefoot in the powder, eat contaminated
food. and drink contaminated water until they were evacuated to
4X Mcloudl & Schlet. supra note 13. at 707
49 Id it 651
51) Id at '107
51 (; Johnson. Paradire Lost. BUtLL. ATOM. S( It.NISTS. Dec 1980. at 24. 27 Ihereinaiter
cited a., John-on. Paradse).
52 If WASSI.RMAN & N. SOLOMAN. supra note 44. at 85: G. Johnson. .Icronesia: .4mericar
W$iraiegu" Tnsa. BULL. ATOM f SCtNt-1STs. Feb. 197. at 10. I I[hereinafter cited as Johnson. .t-
cronerta 1. Johnuin. Paradise. supra note 5 I. at 27: Sicard. Compassionaie Compensuauon-Roige.
lap/ilrtk Puiment. 197.. Mi( RONi.SiAN Rt.p. IMicronesian Reporterl. 4th Quarter 1978. at 4.
American personnel on Rongerik Atoll. which is 25 miles east of Rongelap and therefore farther
away from Bikini. were warned of the test and were provided with protective clothing and shelter.
Nevertheless they were evacuated more than 24 hours before the Rongelapese. 1t. WASSIARMAN &
II SOLOMON. supra note 44. at 85. Johnson. Micronesia. supra. at II.
53. Eg.. If WASSERMAN. & N. SOLOMtoN. supra note 44. at 85: G. Johnson. Marshall Islandr.
the Radwacitze Truri. Ntw. PAC.. Nov.-Dec. 1980. at 16 Ihereinafter cited as Johnwn. ,tiarhall
Various writers range from "over one inch" to "two inches."
54 II WASSF RMAN & N. SOLOMON. supra note 44. at 85 (quoting the Rongelapcsc magis-
trate). Johnson. .Icronesia.supro note 52. at I I; Kiener. Inside Gimpses. GLItpSt'S. 4th Quarter
1979. at 2. 2. Sicard. tupra note 52. at 4.
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Kwajalein more than two days later." Within a few days their symp-
toms included itching. burning. nausea. vomiting, and diarrhea.:"
Shortly afterwards many developed burns on their necks, shoulders.
arms. and feet." In 1957 the Rongelapese were returned to their home
atoll as a result of a report prepared for the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion. It stated. "Even though . . . the radioactive contamination of
Rongelap Island is considered perfectly safe for human habitation, the
levels of activity are higher than those found in other inhabited loca-
tions in the world. The habitation of these people of this island will
afford most valuable ecological radiation data on human beings.""
By 1958. the incidence of stillbirths and miscarriages in exposed
Rongelapese women was more than twice that of unexposed Marshal-
lese women.5 By 1961. the body levels of radioactive cesium in ex-
posed Rongelapese had risen sixty-fold. Body levels of zinc had risen
eight-fold and strontium-ninety six-fold.) For nine years. the Atomic
Energy Commission had told the Rongelapese not to expect any health
problems. In 1963 a twelve-year old Rongelapese girl was found to
have a nodule on her thyroid gland."t Eventually. approximately forty
to fifty per cent of the exposed Rongelapese developed thyroid
problems. ' 2 a rate which can be compared to three to four per cent
among Americans. 3 Nineteen of the twenty-two Rongelapese children
under the age of twelve when Bravo was tested have had surgery for
removal of thyroid nodules," some of which were cancerous."5 In 1972
a Rongelapese who had been one year old when Bravo was tested died
of myelogenous leukemia." In 1979 the Department of Energy told
the Rongelapese that the northern islands of their atoll. which had been
used for food gathering for the preceding twenty years. were too radio-
55 Johnson. .Miroreva. %upra note 52. at lb. Pryor..'uch'ar )$;Ive i 'h' Aiag-ji" I'rfpkna.
(,roundf. (I I.M.I s. 4th Quarter 1979. at lb. 17
56 Johnson. .1arshall. supra note 53. at 16. Johnson. .Mwr, mewa. supra note 52. at II. l'rs or.
supra note 55. at 17
57 Johnson. .tlarihall. iupra note 53. it lb. Johnon. .tI1iirone,a. .mipra, note :,2. ;t 11. John-
son. Paradi te. supra note 5 I. at 28
58 Johnson. Mar.rhall. nipra note 53. at 16. Johnson. icrone'ria. vupra note 52. at 11-12
59. Johnson. Marshall. supra note 53. at lb. Johnson. Micrunesia. supra note 52. at 12
60. Johnson. Micronesia. .ura note 52. at 12
61. Pryor. supra note 55. at 17.
62. The Bikini Bomb 24 )ars .4f er. PA(. 1st. ANDS NoNTI.Y. May 1978. at 5, 5 lhereinafter
cited as Bikini BombI. Johnson. ,Marshall.supra note 53. at 16. Johnson. .liwronesia. rupra note 52.
at 12: Johnson. Paradise. supra note 51. at 28 (quoting Conrad. Summarsr of Tht'raid Findings in
.Mfarshallese 22 Years .4frer Eiposure to Radioactive Fallout. Brtokhaven National Laboratortl,.
No. 21924 (1976)). Pryor. supra note 55. at 17.
63. Johnson, Micronesia. supra note 52. at 12.
64 Johnson. .Marshall. jupra note 53. at 16. Johnson. .Ihrmem.ta. upra note 52. at 12. John.
son. Paradise. supra note 5 I. at 28
65 Johnson. .Marshall. supra note 53. at 16. Pryor. iuprai note 55. at 17
66. Johnson..41tcronesia. supra note 52. at 12: Johnson. Paradise. rupra note 5 1. at 28. Sicard.
tupra note 52. at 8.
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active to visit.n" Some Rongelapese who were away from the atoll dur-
ing the Bravo test were among those returned there in 1957. Within a
few years. their body radioactivity levels equaled those of exposed per-
sons and were ten times those of Marshallese living on uncontaminated
islands."
Although the Rongelapese succeeded in providing -valuable ecologi-
cal radiation data on human beings," in some ways they were lucky. In
a 1979 interview. Maynard Neas. the American administrator of the
Marshalls at the time of the Bravo test, said. -If the people of Rongelap
had been in the North end of their atoll instead of the Southern end
they all would have died.""'
Like the Rongelapese. the 157 people of Utirik. 275 miles east of
Bikini. were not warned to take precautions during the Bravo test.,70 A
day after the explosion, they received a mist-like fallout.7 They were
evacuated more than two days after this exposure."2 The Atomic En-
ergy Commission determined that Utirik was only slightly contami-
nated. and returned the Utirikese three months later.".' Before 1977.
eleven Utirikese had developed thyroid tumors, three of which were
cancerous. " Suddenly. the rate of thyroid trouble there increased, un-
til it equaled that of Rongelap."' One of the thryoid malignancies on
Utirik occurred in the young son of an exposed person. This raised the
possibility of either genetic damage or exposure from radiation remain-
ing on the island. Neither possibility had been previously considered
by medical officials from the Atomic Energy Commission or its succes-
sor. the Energy Research and Development Authority.7"'
When the Bikinians were first evacuated from their islands. they
were led to believe that they would be allowed to return home within
one or two years." It was obvious long before the Bravo test that this
was not true. An underwater atomic bomb test in 1946 left halfa mil-
lion tons of radioactive mud in Bikini's lagoon. In 1947 scientists
found that the lagoon's waters, once clear, had become almost
opaque. ""
6,7 Johnin. /'aradre. vupra note 51. a[ 2X
Oh John.Mn. .Mlcrne.ma. rupra note 52. at 12.
61 Intervitew .MdaInard .eaS. N1It RO.NISlA. R-P.. 2d Quarter 1979. at 2. 4.
':) Johnon. .ficrunesia. rupra note 52. at II: Sicard.s upra note 52. at 4.
71 Pryor. mpra note 55. at 17
72 Johnmn. .IfIcrone.sa..pra note 52. at 12.
73 Id at I I. Pryor. supra note 55. at 17.
74 John-on. ,tfrronera. . .tpra note 52. at 12. Pr'or..rupra note 55. at 17.
75 Johnon. Ifarshall. mpra note 53. at 16. Johnon. ,Ihcrane.sta. rupra note 52. at 12: John-
son. IPaadse. tupra note 51. at 2Z
76. Pryor. jupra note 55. at 17
7,7 Id a, I1
7.( Id at 17. 19
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The Bikinians were initially relocated in Rongerik atoll, which has
one quarter of Bikini's land mass and lagoon area. Many of the fish in
this tiny lafoon were toxic, but the Bikinians had to eat them to avoid
starvation. Within a year. they were "visibly suffering from malnutri-
tion. "' " The Bikinians were temporarily relocated on Kwajalein and
then sent to Kili.
Kili has one quarter of the land mass of Bikini. It is a single island.
not an atoll. and therefore has no sheltered fishing or protected
anchorage. Traditional Bikinian skills which had guaranteed survival
for centuries in an atoll environment were worthless on Kili.' The
waters near Kili are rough enough to make food deliveries by ship im-
possible part of the year. The efforts of the United States to alleviate
these problems were often inadequate.t "
It was impossible to completely restore Bikini Atoll. as some islands
were gone." -' The destruction of large parts of the reef provided an
entrance into the lagoon for sharks." Nevertheless. Bikinians pressed
for a return home. and the United States tried to oblige with a $3 mil-
lion decontamination effort.": In 1969 Bikinians began returning.
However, evidence mounted that radioactivity had saturated the atoll's
Fbod chain. Bv 1977. tests showed an eleven-fold increase in Bikini
residents' body levels of cesium-137," It was determined that ground-
water and coconuts, fruit. and vegetables grown there were unsafe for
human consumption." One scientific report stated that Bikini was
"possibly the best available source of data for evaluating the transfer of
plutonium across the gut wall after being incorporated into biological
svstems."'X" A 1978 medical examination revealed that returned Bikini-
ans had internal radiation levels ranging up to approximately twice
United States maximum safety standardsY" In 1979 the Bikinians were
finally re-evacuated to Kili. Current estimates are that their home is-
7t Id at 19. Ronch. Bikini .Vothunl Left to Lose. NI % PI . N4',, - Dc I'78. at 12. 12-13.
Sktr1.4 a, B-B.4.ombs Over BtAint. Philadelphia Inquirer. Dcc 21. IJSII. at IA. col I . I IA. (.ol
2 1hereinafter cited as S-epl1.4iayI
NJ Johnson. .lironesia. rupra note 52. at 10
XI Pryor. rupra note 55. at 14.
,2 On onc occasion. U.S militan planet dropped food from the air Unfortunals\. no one
had thought to attach parachutes to the food Bags of rice which landed on the beach burt open
on impact and their contents were mixed with sand. D licine. 7, Ebirithtnl 7"tere I a Scson.
MIt Rtt.SIA. RiP.. 2d Quarter 1979. at 27. 29.
N3. Bikini Bomb. supra note 62. at 5. Ronch. supra note 79. at 15.
84. Ronch..sipra note 79. at 15.
X5 D. Nit Iliiitv. .supra note 38. at 59.
• ,6 Johnson. Paradise. supra note 52. at 26.
X7 Btihtn Bomb. supra note 62. at 5
t8 Johnson. Paradise. upra note 52. at 26 (quoting Doe .Ire .resrment a Btini .4ioil. I.at.
fence Livermore Laboratories. UCRL-51879 (June K. 1977))
89 Johnson. .icronesia. supra note 52. at 15.
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lands will not be habitable for thirty to ninety years."
The experiences of the Enewetakese are similar to those of the
Bikinians. They were removed before the tests on their islands and
sent to Ujelang. which has one-fourth of the land area and one-
fifteenth of the lagoon area of their home atoll. One test in 1952 totally
destroyed an island, leaving a one-mile hole in the reef." Long after
nuclear testing had stopped there, simulated nuclear blasts with TNT
wracked their islands, leaving a crater fifty feet deep and 300 feet in
diameter. '" Ultimately these tests were halted by a U.S. District
Court." The United States attempted to clean up Enewetak. at a cost
of over $100 million.' Many Enewetakese have since returned home.
Most of the radioactive debris was dumped in a concrete dome on
Runit. one of the northern islands in the atoll. Although Runit has
been declared off-limits forever." islands within three miles of it are
officially safe for picnics and food gathering."6  American scientists
have not told Enewetakese what to do about migratory birds and tur-
tles which might have come to the safe islands from Runit."?
A 1979 General Accounting Office report indicated that returning
Enewetakese could receive radiation doses in excess of current safety
standards even if they adhered to suggested living standards. "' The
report was originally withheld from the Marshallese because of United
States concern that it would affect ongoing negotiations over liability
and claims."'
The loss of land is much more significant in Micronesia than early
American test planners realized. Land is scarce in the Trust Territory.
which occupies approximately as much area as the continental United
States. but has only two-thirds the land mass of Rhode Island.""k) Own-
ership of land is often a better indication of wealth than money. Land
is a guarantee of food and the raw materials needed for housing, trans-
portation (canoes). fishing equipment. and clothing in perpetuity.
91) S'eA Darnuamaes rm VS.for *Loss (Counir.' 67 A.B.A.J. 412. 413 (1'4I1 jheremattcr
Lited as .$'e Damnagerl. Skipl .4war. supra note 79. at 10A. col. I.
91 Pryor. wpra note 55. at 17
92 1) Mc lit %-sy. supra note 38. at 59
93 People of Lncwctak v Laird. 535 1 Supp. 811 I(D. Hawaii 1973).
94 Thomas..Vuelear Coniamnation: *.S't in Our Backrard'. Na w PAt.. No% -1)cc. 19S0. it
28. if)
95 Johnson. Paradse.. upra note 5 I. at 24: Thomas. supra note 94. at 29 Some writers have
estimated that Runit need be off limits for only 24.000 years. Pryor. rupra note 55. at 22
96 Johnson. Paradise. supra note 5 I. at 24.
97 Id
98 Id. at 25 (quoting General Accounting Oflice. Enewetak Aioll-CTleanvnk' L Nuclear ("on.
lanlnahlon. PSAI) 79-54 lMay X. 1979)). See also G. Johnson. Plea A" Indpendent (heh on
Radtiaton. P( ISLANDt)S M|ONTIII.1#. August 1979. at 17: Thomas. supra note 94. at 30-31.
99 Johnson. Pleafor Independent Cheek on Radiation. supra note 98. at 17.
It1) Bo.r. .1ltsronesta The .4merncantrafton of Eden. 131 NAT'L Gt:O;RAPIt" 702. 704
(14671
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Money, however, can be lost, squandered. or become worthless as for-
eign administrations change and the peso is replaced by the mark.
which is replaced by the yen, which is replaced in turn by the dollar.
Land ownership is the underlying basis-of Micronesian culture, and
land is rarely sold. Efforts by the United States to acquire land in the
Trust Territory by means other than the creation of a fee simple subject
to radiation subsequent usually involve torturous negotiations and
often result in litigation. As author Kenneth Brower noted. "Land is
the rarest of commodities in Micronesia. and its ownership is at the
heart of Micronesian lineage and ranking systems. It is nearly impossi-
ble to alienate land in the islands, as numerous foreign administrators
have found out."1'0 While a Micronesian culture could probably sur-
vive some radiation injuries, it might not survive loss of a homeland
and an accompanying loss of traditional skills and lifestyles.
This points to another possible violation of the Trusteeship Agree-
ment resulting from United States tests. Article VI of the Agreement
requires that the United States promote the economic advancement
and self-sufficiency of Trust Territory inhabitants." 2 Thirty years of
having to choose between living on islands too small to support their
populations or eating contaminated food have pushed the Bikinians
and Enewetakese away from a lifestyle which was self-sufficient for
centuries and towards dependence on United States handouts.
For several years. the United States claimed that only Enewetak. Bi-
kini. and Rongelap were affected by nuclear weapons tests. As noted
above, in the niid-1970's Utirik was added to that list. In 1979 a De-
partment of Energy report stated that eleven other atolls or single is-
lands had received intermediate range fallout.'"* On Ailuk, 250 miles
east of Bikini. more than ten percent of the population has developed
lime-sized growths on various parts of their bodies.""' In 1980 the A/i-
cronesian Independent reported that on Likiep. 300 miles southeast of
Bikini with a population of 406. nine women have had babies with se-
vere mental retardation. One woman had three "strange" stillborn ba-
bies. "one completely unrecognizable as human." Ten other babies
there were abnormal.'"5 Throughout the Marshalls, arrowroot, a staple
of the Marshallese diet for centuries, is becoming extinct."'
Lingering radiation may also be responsible for many health
101. K. BROWE-R. MCRONESIA Tilt: LA. D. Till: PI.OPLI. ANt) Till. SIhA 21 (1981).
102. Trusie.rhip .4greement. supra note 10. art. 6.
103. Johnson. Paradise. supra note 51. at 28 (quoting U.S. t)cpartnent of Energy. .othern
Jfarhall Islands Radiation Sarver (May 1978)).
104. Johnson. Marshall. .rpta note 53. at 17.
105 Johnson. Paradise. supra note 51. at 28 (quoting The ?3.bViJ Year Question. M icronc,,an
Independent. June 6. 1980).
106 Johnson. MIarshall. supra note 53. at 17
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problems attributed to other causes. Radiation reduces the body's sup-
ply of new white corpuscles, without which the body is easily overpow-
ered by any common infection."0 7 A UN visiting mission to the
Marshalls reported in 1956 that the white blood cells of Rongelapese
were suppressed to 50% of normal four to six weeks after the Bravo
test.' 8 As diarrhea and intestinal diseases. pneumonia. and influenza
are among the four leading causes of death in Micronesia,' any effect
that previous or current radiation exposure is having on white blood
cells could contribute to apparently non-radiation related deaths.
United States testing on Christmas and Johnston Islands did not con-
clude until 1962. The wind patterns over those islands are such that
fallout would be carried towards the Marshalls. "' Given the results of
prior tests, consequences from these tests, if any. would just be starting
to manifest themselves. In 1979 it was claimed that missiles being shot
into Kwajalein Atoll. site of a United States tracking station, contained
uranium. A Marshallese government source claimed that as a result
the lagoon's uranium levels exceeded U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency limits."' These new threats, combined with lingering radiation
elsewhere and the possibility of genetic damage. indicate that the mate-
rial above might require constant updating.
The United States Congress has passed three statutes appropriating
compensation for affected Marshallese." 2  Various compensation
schemes have ranged from insultingly low' '3 to $l100,00 for the family
of the Rongelapese leukemia victim." 4 Marshallese generally feel that
they are receiving less than they would have if they had been Ameri-
cans living near Nevada testing ranges,' ' and are seeking additional
compensation in American courts.'' 6 Marshallese and American nego-
tiators have recently agreed to a settlement in which the United States
107 W SHit( Li 7. Tin. 01 1 It IAL RllPORT O- O ATION ('ROSROAI) 142 (19471
108 tYAmdto. Legal.4specis of i'rnch .'uclear Tests. 61 Ast. J. Isit 1.. 66. 74-75 0l967)
refrring to Report of the United Nations Visiting Misson to the Trust Territoruies in the Pacific
1956. U N Trusteeship Council. Oflicial Records. I8th Sess.. Supp. No. 3 (T/1278). at 26-28. 45j.
109 UNITI.) SIAT.S DEPARTME.NT OF STAlE.. 34Ti ANNUAL Ri.P)Rr ro till UNIri.I) N.--
I Io.%% CIN T1ll AtmOINISTRATION 01 Till, TRUST TERRITORY o- rill, PAC it it ISLANIDS 114 (19XI)
I I0. Johnson. ,1arshall. stzpra note 53. at 17.
I I 1 Okcuyng A'a~jalern. PA. ISLANDS MONTHLY. Sept. 1979. at 9.
112. An Act to Authorize Appropriations for Certain Insular Areas of the United States. Pub
L No 96-205. 94 Stat, 84 (1980): An Act to Authorize Appropriations for the Territories of the
United States. Pub. L. No. 95-134. 91 Stat. 1159 (1977): An Act to Provide for the Settlement of
Claims of Certain Residents of the Trust Terntory of the Pacific Islands. Pub. L. No 88-4115. 78
Stat 598 (1964). See also Sicard. supra note 52.
113. One compensation plan paid Bikmnians less than $80.00 apiece for use of their land and
cstablished a trust fund which paid them S16.75 twice a year. Runch. supra note 79. at 15.
114 Pryor. supra note 55. at 18-19.
115. Id at 23.
116 Vee Seek Damages. supra note 9. Pacyr Islands Sue the U.S fur .SCft' Millo/n. N.Y
Times. Oct. 17. 1982. § I. at 7. col. 2.
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will officially recognize its responsibility for the consequences of the
nuclear weapons tests and establish a $150 million trust fund for the
islanders. The fund is expected to produce over $180 million in income
over the next fifteen years. After fifteen years. three-quarters of the
trust income will be set aside in perpetuity for claims that may arise.
with the remaining one-quarter used for medical and other services.
An additional $47.5 million will be made available to cover any further
personal injury claims against the United States. with such claims be-
ing decided by a special tribunal. As part of this agreement. Marshal-
lese will drop the above-mentioned lawsuits, in which they are seeking
damages totalling over four billion dollars. The agreement must be
approved by a referendum in the Marshall Islands. the United States
Senate. and the United Nations Security Council. ' 7 In evaluating past
and proposed compensation schemes, it must be remembered that those
islanders who lost land are seeking compensation for loss of a perpetual
supply of life's necessities. Those who were exposed to radiation may
be seeking compensation for future generations of harmed individualN.
Debate continues as to whether the plight of the Marshallese is the
result of a deliberate experiment or a continuing series of military. sci-
entific, and medical errors. Many in the Pacific believe the former."'
These beliefs are supported by statements, admittedly often taken out
of context, of American military and scientific personnel. "" Problem,
with the United States medical program and United States resistance to
independent scientific investigation and medical treatment have con-
vinced many Marshallese that they are guinea pigs. rather than pa-
tients.' 2" Whatever the factual answer to this debate may be, any
I1- %Iaa,,s. VS . lIlanderr Reach Pa t (in .4-Te.it Danuter. Wa..hington Post. June 2S. NIN1.
at \2. col 3
I IN Nee. eg, . II W.i.i m%-, & N Sot tio'-.. vupr, note 44. at Me, tquoting Rongelafipci.
Johnon. .tltorshall. umpraj note 53. at 16 (quoting Utirikee liter to Atonic |nerg. ('mIvIINlltll
"e'e alro Danger of lallout Said A'noHn. rupra note 44. at 2. col 5 Man% Anerican% uIing nc.or
tetinL %tes in the American West have %imilar bhcliefs See 7h" fl'et .4 Secret Letha/ l ab. ( hi
1 ribune. April I. 1979. at I. col. 2
I) Eg. A II [-I LiI ( rs oi Nut II WI Ap-)',s il 149(S (;laston ed IN() (prepared b,
U S )cpartment of t)efense. published b, Atomic Energ Comrnisionl Eexplains why c:ultural
and clinatological FaLcors made .Marshallc., valuable research %ubjects). W Siivm I II I. supra
note 107. at 3, 4. 7. 16 (medical research goals of Operation Crossroads) (Inadcquac., of research it
hiroshima and Nagasaki) (possihiit, that fallout could injure persons within 3(i) mile% o te,t
,itc). Johnson. Paradi. supra note 51. at 28 (quoting Admiral Lewis Strauss of Atomic L:nerg.
Commission on return from Bikini in 1954: 'lAli no time was the tcsting out of controK No
test is made without a definite purpose and a careful determination that is directed to an end reult
of major impoflan. c.")
120. See Political Status Commission of the Marshall Islands. lQ7 Interim Repurt 23. re.
printed in Current Problems in the .larshall Ilands- flearinnrs Re/aore the Suhrcomm. 'in Territtortal
.4lair.f ofthe llou.se Comm. on Interior and In.rular .4fj/irs. 94th Cong. 2d Se,, 95. 107 19711)
(**Because of the AtE-(" initial role in conducting the tests and ERI)A', continuing role a% a pro-
ponent of plutonium (the primary contaminating material at Bikini and linewctak) as a fuel tot
electrical generation, the Bikini people testified they arc unwilling to rely on anal,,is by |I-RDA or
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future potential nuclear users of the ocean face the double burden of
convincing Pacific governments of both their competence and their
good intentions.
At the time McDougal and Schlei's security interests bowled over
various straw men. they were relying on limited data. The AEC had
reported soon after the Bravo test that no Marshallese had suffered ra-
diation burns and all were well.' The American administrator of the
Marshalls had gathered indigenous leaders together shortly after the
test and warned them that "whosoever breathed a word of the incident
would be shot before sunrise." 122 It is possible that if McDougal and
Schlei were to revise their article in light of information that has since
become available, they would reconsider their verdict of reasonable-
ness. Unfortunately. the "balancing" and "reasonableness'" rationales
they developed were echoed. sometimes without citation and perhaps
sometimes with distortion, as justifications for further United States
tests. '2 for the Pauling court's refusal to enjoin the tests at issue. and
lbr the later French tests.
It is also possible that a -balancer" might weigh the long-term results
of the tests against United States security interests and still consider the
tests legal. McDougal and William T. Burke. Professor of Law at the
University of Washington, noted that the tests "have been carried out
in parts of the sea far removed from populations of any appreciable
magnitude."'"" It is possible that a balancer could weigh the welfare of
unappreciated Marshallese against the harm that would be caused by
an undeterred Soviet Union. Similarly. even if one completely ac-
cepted the charges that the United States deliberately experimented on
the Marshallese, the evils of performing harmful experiments on inno-
cent persons could be balanced against, and outweighed by, perceived
security benefits. If the study of radiation victims yields valuable mili-
tary data regarding the composition of the bomb that harmed them or
the effects radiation would have on soldiers, any right exposed Mar-
shallese have to independent and accurate scientific and medical advice
could lose a balancing test against the need to prevent leaks of security-
Iormcr ALC %aentots of data froin radiation surveys."). ERI2.4 :& Medc'al Pr ,ram ("rt,:z'd.
(it mi~'ii %. 4th Quarter 1977. at 20: Johnson..larshall. supra note 53. at 10. 18. Johnson..tirone'.
ita. supra note 52. at 12. 13 (letter from Rongelapc.%c magistrate) (U.S. linall. allowed-ndepcnd-
oni dtl'or% to accompan, At-C team alter Roneglapce refu ed to undergo 1972 examinaton...
121 R Lar'P. mpra note 35. at 53. Conira Tim EF -A TS o N I.AR WI.AOMS..'upra note
I IN. at 603-06 (U S go'ernment publication containig pictures of Marhallese with radiation
burn%. although burns may not have de,,elopcd until after the AI- statement).
122 I) Ileine. ruira note 82. at 29
123 Q, Doyle. Radioactive 1; ite Pt rptral .tfobhn s-and Freedomfir .Vucear irver. JACJ .
April 19 . at 12. 14 (U S olicial it (;enca Confrtlence on the Law of the Sea took position that
U S tcsting on high %s as reasonable. and therefore legal)
124 .M M l)ot ,,.& W t iki. TiI Pt Oi I Om k l 1it 0( i-',. 772 '162)
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related information.'" However, this still leaves open the question of
why the Marshallese had to bear such a disproportionate share of the
costs of deterring Russia.'26 Therefore, not only must the lives, prop-
erty. and health of the Marshallese be balanced against the temporary
security interests of the United States, they must also be balanced
against the lives, property, and health of any other population group.
McDougal felt that it was not unreasonable for the United States to test
"'in preparation for the defense of. . . all the values of a free world
society." '- One must wonder if it is "reasonable" to protect free world
values by engaging in balancing tests which require the adoption of
values more closely associated with free world opponents.
Evidence mounted that the fallout from nuclear testing affected not
just persons within a few hundred miles of the test sites, but instead was
causing a measurable increase in atmospheric radiation with harmful
consequences worldwide.' 2 ' In 1963, the United States became a party
to the Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapons Tests in the Atmosphere. in
Outer Space. and Under Water of August 5, 1963.12" The treaty's title
is self-explanatory, and the United States abided by its terms and
stopped testing in the Pacific. As of 1980, 110 states were parties to this
treaty. France has never signed the treaty.
B. French Tests in Pohnesia
The next major dispute related to nuclear activity in the Pacific in-
volved above-ground French nuclear tests in Polynesia. France began
its nuclear testing in Algeria. but had to find a new site for several
reasons. First. Algeria became independent. Next, fallout from an Al-
gerian test had blown across the Mediterranean to Europe."' Finally.
France may have been influenced by United Nations General Assem-
bly resolutions calling for the cessation of nuclear weapons tests in Af-
rica.' The decision was made to relocate the tests in French Polynesia
on the island of Moruroa.
125 C7 R LAPP. supra note 35. at 141 IUS rerusal to supplv information to Jap.nes, doctor%
treatine i.hermen injured bi, Bravo's fallout)
126 This, que.tion rcmains open even if it is assumed that Micronesians also benefited from
ha% ng Rus.sia deterred, an assumptior which %.%ould probably be correct. The costs born by a few
hundred or thousand .Marshall,: would still be disproporlionate when compared to those Iorn b)
the se'.eral million citazyci. of the U.S. and other countries under the umbrella of U.S. nuclear
protection
127 McDougal. Thi I/drogen Bomb Tests and Internaiional Labs ol'the Sea. 49 AM. J. . 1'i
1. 356. 361 (1955).
12N If W.'.i.t.' & N SOLOMION. upra note 44. at 92-110.
129 14 IS T 1313.408 UN.TS. 43.
13) (i Johnson. Tejtmg La Bombe in rench Poulnesia. Ni-w PAC.. Nov -Dec 1980. at 22
Ihercenalter cited as Johnson. Testing i.
131 (;oldie. The .Vuclear Tet Cues: Restrarntts o Envtronmental i/arm. 5 J. .MAR. . & CO'.
49i. 497 (1973-74)
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While the United States generally tried to at least create an impres-
sion of concern for world opinion and the welfare of indigenous in-
habitants. France. perhaps more honest rather than less humanitarian.
had little concern for such niceties. The French ignored protests from
both elected and traditional island leaders, protests which echoed the
sentiments of nearly the entire Polynesian population. 3 2 Shortly
before the tests began in 1966, France declared a danger zone. When it
was pointed out that the zone included seven inhabited atolls, the zone,
but apparently not the yield of the bombs, was reduced so that it in-
cluded only one. Tureia.1" In 1966 the French government assured a
member of the Polynesian Territorial Assembly that all migratory fish
sold in the major fish market on Papeete would be checked for radioac-
tivity. This checking was never done.' 34 When the people of Tureia
were evacuated shortly before a series of tests in 1968, the French ex-
planation was that the entire population of the atoll was very patriotic
and had asked the French government for transportation to Bastille
Day festivities on Tahiti.'"
In 1966 General DeGaulle visited Moruroa to observe a test. On the
scheduled test date the wind was blowing toward several inhabited ar-
eas, including Samoa, Fiji. and the Cook Islands. The test was post-
poned. The following day wind conditions were the same, but
DeGaulle was in a hurry to return to Paris. Therefore, the tests pro-
ceeded as scheduled, resulting in fallout upon the above-mentioned
islands. "'
France claimed that the tests were safe, but refused to release any
health or environmental data, and also refused to allow investigation
by independent scientists or physicians.'3 7 Meanwhile, scientists else-
where claimed that the French tests were responsible for an increasing
level of radioactivity in fish caught off the coast of Mexico and a five-
fold increase in the radioactivity of rainwater in Fiji."'I
With America no longer testing above ground or outside its own ter-
ritory. France filled a void for scholars. Prior to the commencement of
legal French testing, freedom of the seas had been codified in article I1
of the Convention on the High Seas of April 29, 1958. " It stated that
this freedom was comprised, "inter alia," of freedom of navigation,
fishing, the laying of submarine cables and pipelines, and flight over
132. D'Amato. supra note 108. at 67: Johnson. Tevtig. .upra note 130. at 22.
133. Johnson. Tevang. supra note 130. at 22.
134. Id at 23.
135. Id at 25.
136. Id at 22-23
137 Id at 25.
13X. Id
139. 450 U N T.S. X2. 13 U.S.T. 2312.
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the high seas. Article II further said that these freedoms, and "others
which are recognized by the general principles of international law.
shall be exercised by all States with reasonable regard to the interests of
other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas." This. of
course, provided legal scholars the opportunity to debate the meanings
of terms such as -inter alia." -others.- and "reasonable. '""
The debate followed the lines of the earlier debate on similar issues
in regard to United States tests, but this time the consensus, at least in
English-language legal periodicals, was much more solidly against the
legality of testing. This was due in part to a better understanding of the
effect upon fisheries."' Arguments based on the Trail Smneler case,',
Article 73 of the United Nations Charter,' and the Genocide Conven-
tion "' resembled those made about American tests. Scholars now had
the opportunit y to debate whether or not the Test Ban Treaty was cus-
tomary law.'. The absence of a convincing security rationale for
French testing convinced most writers that these tests should be distin-
guished from those conducted by the United States on the grounds that
the French tests could not be justified as necessary for world security.
France was not the sole agent for one side in a global bipolar nuclear
balance of terror.14" The strongest support that France received in an
English-language legal periodical may have come from Mercer. He de-
scribed the French tests as "reprehensible," "heartless," and "im-
moral," but "not illegal," largely because the possible critical health
risks had not yet materialized. " '
Anthony A. D'Amato, Instructor in Political Science at Wellesley
College, proclaimed his support of McDougal and Schlei's theories and
the previous United States tests. Nevertheless, he rejected arguments
in favor of French testing. One such argument was that the tests would
restore France's prestige in the eyes of the world. Terming this the
"grandeur" argument, D'Amato noted that the tests brought France
worldwide condemnation rather than grandeur. ' He also commented
140. Yee. e.g., Comment. Explost'e rsue..rupra note 26. at 302-04 (iligh Seas Convention
does not make all nuclear testing illegal per se. but France has crossed line into unreasonable
interference with fi1gh Seas freedoms). Mercer. supra note 27. at 405-08 (France has not violated
High Seas Convention).
141. See. e.g.. Mercer.supra note 27. at 407.
142 Comment. .rplosi'e Issue. supra note 26. at 298. Mercer. supra note 28. at 419
143. D'Amato..supra note 108. at 72: Mercer..rupra note 28. at 419.
144. D*Amato..nupra note 108.. at 75-76.
145. Id at 68: Mercer. supra note 28. at 420.
14t). D'Amato. .upra note 108. at 70-71. 75-76.
147. Mercer. supra note 28. at 421. A~sume that thalidomide has been banned from country X
because it had produced birth defects there. Applying Mercer's logic. if thalidomide is then intro-
duced into country Y a few years later. it ma% not be banned there until the possible critical health
risks materialize nine months later.
148. D'Amato. supra note 108. at 69.
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that if France's actions encouraged other nations to develop nuclear
arsenals, this would bring grandeur to none but insecurity to all.'+ He
then turned to France's argument that France could not rely on United
States protection and needed its own nuclear deterrent. D'Amato sug-
gested that France was probably not capable of developing an arsenal
which would effectively deter Russia, but might be able to develop one
which would encourage the Soviets to rely on a preemptive nuclear first
strike rather than conventional military forces if hostilities did break
out between the two countries.t' ° After reviewing the then available
data on the effects of United States testing in the Marshalls, D'Amato
stated, apparently with no irony intended, the following:
Because France has neither the technical experience of the United
States nor the financial resources which may be devoted to safe-guard-
ing the test sites, it may well be argued that the French tests constitute
at least as great. and perhaps a greater threat to the people of Polynesia
than those of the United States constituted to the Marshall Islanders.e'e
France continued testing. ignoring protests from Australia. the Cook
Islands. Nauru. Fiji. Tonga. Chile. Western Samoa. Peru. the United
States and Britain. 5 2 In 1973 the Australian Academy of Scientists re-
ported that French tests could cause 1000 deaths and disabilities in sub-
sequent generations of Australians. including ten cases of thyroid
cancer and many cases of other forms of cancer.'- 3 Without pausing to
determine if this harm would be reasonable under a McDougal-Schlei
balancing test. Australia and New Zealand brought suit in the Interna-
tional Court of Justice seeking to enjoin the tests. The Australian and
New Zealand claims were based on the following:
I) a right of all states to be free from nuclear weapons tests conducted
149 Id
150. Id at 69-70 The French government disagreed with this criticism. See Ambassade de
France. Serv:ce de Press et D'Ilnformation. Excerpts From the Address by French Premier Jac-
ques Chirac Before the French Senate 4 (June 10. 1975) (France is third-ranking nuclear power in
the world, with arsenal sufficiently diversified and developed to constitute a major threat to a
potential aggressor).
151. D'Amato. supra note 108. at 74.
152. See D'Amato. supra note 108. at 66-67: Johnson. Testing. supra note 130. at 25: Com-
ment. E.tplasire isue. supra note 26. at 304.
153. Comment. E.rplosire Issue. supra note 26. at 297. Some scientists disputed this conclu-
sion. See The International Court of Justice The Vuclear Test Catses: Judicial Silence r. tomic
Blasts. 16 1IARV. 1Nr'L L.J. 614. 620 (1975) Ihereinafter cited as Judicial Silencel. The French
government claimed that the tests were absolutely safe. and that their safety had been verified by
the United Nations Scientific Committee. Ambassade de France. Service de Presse et
D'lnformation. Address by His Excellency Jean Sauvagnargues, French Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs Before the 29th Session of the United Nations General Assembly. 8 (Sept. 23. 1974): Ambas-
sade de France. Service de Pressc et D'lnformation. French Nuclear Tests in the Pacific
Communique from the Office of the President of the Republic I (June 8. 1974). Phillipmes For-
eign Secretary Carlos P. Romulo suggested that if the tests were as safe as France claimed they
should be held as tourist attractions on the French Riviera. Romulo Challenges Irance. N.Y.
Times. Sept. 16. 1973. at 4. col. I.
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by any state. by virtue of a customary rule of law based on the Test
Ban Treaty. United Nations resolutions, and other sources:
2) a right, inherent in their sovereignty, not to be subjected to deposits
of fallout in their territory and dispersion of fallout in their air-
space: and
3) a right to have France respect freedom of the high seas, by not
interfering with freedom of navigation and passage through air-
space and by not polluting the high seas.' '54
France's position was that Australia and New Zealand had not suffered
any legally recognizable damage. Neither, claimed France. had they
shown any violation of any legal norms concerning the threshold whichi
atomic pollution should not exceed, nor had they established that nu-
clear testing is automatically unlawful.'5 -
However, France chose to proceed in the International Court of Jus-
tice solely by attacking the court's jurisdiction. The court has jurisdic-
tion over states to the exent which they have submitted to its
jurisdiction in declarations, made pursuant to article 36 of the Statute
of the International Court of Justice,' recognizing the court's jurisdic-
tion. Prior to the Nuclear Tests cases. France had been a party plaintiff
and party defendant in more proceedings before the International
Court of Justice and its predecessor, the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice. than any other state. Nevertheless. France refused to
appoint an agent to represent it before the court in these cases, and
refused to become a party to the proceedings. Before judgment was
rendered, it withdrew its acceptance of the court's compulsory jurisdic-
tion.'" Despite this withdrawal, on June 22. 1973, without prejudging
the merits, the International Court of Justice issued interim orders in-
structing France to avoid nuclear tests causing the deposit of radioac-
tive fallout on Australian or New Zealand territory.'15  Less than a
month after the International Court of Justice orders. France began a
new series of tests. This controversy, of course, provided fuel for more
legal commentary.
S. Azadon Tiewul, a doctoral candidate at Harvard Law School and
former Associate Research fellow at the Center for International Stud-
ies. reexamined the McDougal-Schlei reasonableness tests. He stated
that because nuclear tests completely obstruct all other uses of the
154. Nuclear Tests (Austraha v. France). 1973 I.C.J. 99. 103 (Interim Protective Order of 22
June 1973): Judicial Silence. srupra note 153. at 631-32.
155. Goldie. supra note 131. at 498-99.
156. 1977 Yearbook of the United Nations 1190.
157. See J. Sw..NI.y. C. ')iv.R & N. Li.EcII. Tt. INT.R.NATIONAL LiEAl. SYSTI.M 54-71 (2d
ed. 1981) (general discussion of I.C.J. jurisdiction and cases involving France).
158. Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France). 1973 I.C.J. 99 (Interim Protective Order of 22 June
1973): Nuclear Tests (New Zealand v. France). 1973 I.C.J. 135 (Interim Protective Order of 22
June 1973).
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ocean, one cannot determine the reasonableness of testing by balancing
them first against fishing, then against navigation, etc. Instead, he felt
they should be balanced in one single computation against the sum to-
tal of all other possible ocean uses. Under this new formula, he de-
cided that testing on the high seas was illegal.' 59
One commentator concluded that the value to international security
of French tests "is at best non-existent and is more probably nega-
tive." ' He noted that the tests were a serious source of friction be-
tween France and Pacific states. Furthermore, the danger of a
catastrophic nuclear accident would be greater in a multi-power system
than in a bipolar system. Finally, the French tests provided impetus
and justification for other nations of a similar size or position to create
their own independent nuclear force, either as a perceived military ne-
cessity or as a symbol of prestige.' 6'
L.F.E. Goldie. Director of the International Legal Studies Program
at Syracuse University, suggested that the French tests, by forcing other
states to accept the policies and budgetary priorities needed to respond
to pollution. could violate article 2 of the United Nations Charter.
which states. -All members shall refrain in their international relations
from the . . use of force against the territorial integrity . . . of any
state." '" He interpreted the International Court of Justice orders as
establishing that a state claiming injury from radioactive fallout would
not have to carry the difficult burden of having to prove that the nu-
clear tests complained of crossed some forbidden threshhold.' 3 Goldie
also concluded that the International Court of Justice orders estab-
lished that an offending state cannot earn the fight to continue its viola-
tions by paying compensation.' 4  He recommended that the
International Court of Justice establish a regime in which testing would
be prohibited altogether or permitted only up to indubitably safe
levels. ':
159 Tiewul. International Lam- and Nuclear Test Erplosions on the High Seas. 8 CORI I L
iT't L.J. 45. 47 (1974).
160. Comment. French Nuclear Tests.- .4 Crisisfor International Law. 4 DLN. J. INT'L 1.. &
POL'Y 11I. 121 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Comment. French Testsl.
161. According to 1980 population estimates, the following nations were among those with
populations larger than France: Bangladesh. Brazil. Indonesia. Japan. Mexico. and Nigeria. The
following nations were among those with populations at least 70% as large as France: Iran. South
Korea. Phillipines. Thailand. Turkey. and Vietnam. See WORLD ALMANAC BOOK OF FACTS 497-
598 (1]. Lane ed. 1982). lf-position- as well as s;e is considered, many of these nations currently
have more security problems than France. However. as D'Amato noted, by signing the Test Ban
Treaty. most nations indicated that they did not feel a need to protect themselves with atmos-
pheric tests. D'Amato. supra note 108. at 68.
162. Goldie. supra note 131. at 503.
163. Id at 504.
164. Id at 505.
165 Id at 505.
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Legal scholars were increasingly prepared to accept the Test Ban
Treaty as customary international law, especially in view of over-
whelmingly approved United Nations resolutions on nuclear prolifera-
tion and the environment, the advent of the disarmament decade, and
various treaties dealing with non-proliferation. '1' One writer suggested
that the policy against atmospheric testing might be approaching the
level ofjus cogens. 'J
Protests against France mounted. The governments of Argentina.
Australia. Canada. India. Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia. New Zealand.
Peru. the Phillipines. Singapore. and South Vietnam voiced varying de-
grees of displeasure. with Peru going the farthest by breaking off" diplo-
matic relations with France.' An editorial in the Far Eastern
Economic Reriew probably reflected the views of many Asians and Pa-
cific islanders when it stated French actions were based on the old colo-
nial belief that "life is cheap" in non-Western lands. The editorial
accused France of ignoring its tradition of respect for law by disregard-
ing the International Court of Justice orders. It concluded. "JAI colo-
.nial hypocrisy characterizes the French rationale for the tests-the
massive series of devices triggered by the Russians and the Americans
and the British during the Cold War. Paris solemnly pretends that
nothing has changed since-no non-proliferation treaty, no SALT
The French people did not unanimously endorse their government's
nuclear policies. High ranking Roman Catholic prelates in France op-
posed the testing. 7 " and Franeois Mitterand. the runner-up in the 1974
French presidential elections, was also against the tests."'
At first the official French reaction to the protests against its 1973
tests was characteristic of the way the testing program had previously
been conducted. Foreign Minister Michel Jobert declared that the pro-
tests "will not prevent me from sleeping well at night" and concluded.
"IThis fuss is running out of breath and will die in the face of France's
16t Tiewul. supra note 159. at 58; Comment. te'nch -etvs..rupra note 100. at 113. 115. 123
16 7 Comment. International (ourl e~fJustice ilas Prdtmtnarrs Jurisdielton to Indt4ae I'inti
Mfea.rures ofProtection: he Nuclear Test Cases. 7 N.Y U. J INI'L L. & Pot'. 10. 175 (1974)
"Jus Cogcn," refers to a prcemptory norm of general international law. accepted and recognited
bv the international community of State. as a whole as a norm from uhich nil dero t.iion IS,
permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international l.1i
having the same character. Vienna Convention on the Law of'rreati, opened for _ignttre May
22. 1969. art. 53. U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 39/27.
168. Wain. La Bombe." Asia and French Phlegm. FAR E. E'os. Ri.v. IFar latern Lconomic
Review]. July 30. 1973. at 12.
169 Editorial. French Ftlh. IAlt E. Et o.. Ri.-, . July 30. 1973. at II.
170 French Clew-r. ,4rmi Clash Oser.4-Tes.r. N Y. Times. Jul% 18. I973. at I. col 4
17I. 1'rench Plan tnal Series uf4-Test in Atmosphere. N.Y.Tims. June 9. 1974. § I. at I. col
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determination to ensure its own defense."' ? France conducted another
series of tests in violation of the Interim Orders in 1974.17 3 Reform
Minister Jean-Jacques Servan-Schreiber was dismissed by President
Valery Giscard d'Estaing for holding a news conference to denounce
the decision to proceed with the 1974 test.""
Finally, however, with a final International Court of Justice decision
approacfiing, France announced that it would cease atmospheric test-
ing and shift to underground testing on Moruroa and Fangataufa.
France claimed that this decision was simply the result of French tech-
nological advances. One French legal scholar. Pierre Lellouche. a doc-
toral candidate at Harvard Law School, noted the higher costs of
underground tests and suspected that international pressure was a ma-
jor factor in the shift.' - The International Court of Justice interpreted
France's declarations as binding legal obligations and determined that
the Australian and New Zealand claims were moot.' 7" In a separate
opinion. Judge Gros outlined France's now-irrelevant legal
justifications.
Gros claimed that Australia was making a political move with no
legal basis."" He claimed that Australia was estopped from asserting
its claim because of its active cooperation with United States and
United Kingdom tests in the Pacific.t "' He asserted that the principle
of sovereign equality gave France the same current right to test which
the United States previously had."" He stated that previous Australian
radiation studies had shown that the French tests were unlikely to re-
sult in significant health hazards for the Australian populationt"t" and
claimed that the three nuclear powers which were original parties to the
Test Ban Treaty did not interpret it as imposing a legal norm on non-
parties.'' Gros cited the American Pauling case to support the legality
of atmospheric nuclear tests.'"
The French finally received support in an English-language legal pe-
172 Wain. supra note 168. at 13.
1 '3 Khosda. Nuclear Teri Caser" Judicial l'our r. Judicial Discreitn. 18 INt)IAN J. INT'L L.
322. 328 11978i
174 ;tward Dirm.ses Servan-Schretber in .4-Tert Dispute. N.Y. Times. June 10. 1974. at I.
col 4
175 Judicial.$ilence. supra note 153. at 635-.36.
176 Nuclear Tests (Australia v France). 1974 I.C.J. 253 (judgment of 20 Dec. 1974): Nuclear
Tests (New Zealand v. France). 1974 I.CJ. 457 (judgment of 20 Dcc. f974).
177. 1974 I.C.J. at 276-80 (Gros. J.. separate opinion).
178. Id at 280-82. In New Zealand's case. Judge Gros had to substitute "support" for active
cxiMperation. 1974 .C J. at 481 (Gros. 3.. separate opinion). Gros appears to conform to the view
of the French government taken by the editors of the Far Eastern Ecanomic Review in that he
pretended nothing had changed since those earlier tests. See Editorial. supra note 169. at II.
179 1974 L.C J. at 284-85 (Gros. J.. separate opinion).
180 Id at 285.
181 Id. at 287.
182 Id at 298 n. 1.
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riodical in an article written by Lellouche shortly after the Interna-
tional Court of Justice decisions. Lellouche primarily elaborated on
theories raised in Gros's opinion. However. in expanding on the sover-
eign equality argument he came close to exposing its foolishness. Lel-
louche noted that the United States and USSR had each conducted
over 150 atmospheric tests. while France had conducted only forty-
seven. Therefore. if France were required to stop testing. it would be
penalized simply because it was late in developing its nuclear programs
by comparison with the United States and USSR. "' - In short. Lal-
louche seems to be saying that the principle of sovereign equality re-
quires that every nation be allowed to conduct over 150 atmospheric
nuclear tests. While some nations. perhaps Upper Volta or Nauru.
might not use their full quota, anything remotely approximating full
exercise of this claimed legal right would entail well over 10.000 atmos-
pheric nuclear tests. One must wonder about the wisdom of a rule of
international law that creates a legal right which, if exercised. would
probably make the Earth uninhabitable.
The French testing shifted underground despite warnings from one
French volcanologist that the rocks in Fangataufa Atoll were so porous
and lacking in shock resistance that there was a risk of radioactive leak-
age.' '4 In 1979. a bomb became wedged 2800 feet down in a 4200 Ibot
shaft on Moruroa. Unable to dislodge it. the French exploded it where
it was. Within hours of the blast, a tidal wave struck Moruroa. over-
turning vehicles and injuring people. French spokesmen originally ex-
pressed their surprise at this strange coincidence but finally admitted
that the blast had caused the wave.'"5
In addition to underground tests. the French government conducted
detonation experiments in concrete bunkers on the surface of Moruroa.
Critics claimed that these experiments released unknown quantities of
plutonium into the environment. On one occasion in 1979 a crew of
decontaminators accidentally ignited gas in one of the bunkers. Two of
the decontaminators were killed and the other four were injured in the
resulting explosion. The French government claimed that the accident
was chemical and not nuclear, but refused to release any other infor-
mation which would reveal how much. if any. plutonium was released
in this accident.' "'
France continues to refuse to release scientific reports of test results
or permit independent monitoring of the Polynesian people and their
183 Judicial Silence. supra note 153. at 632
184 Johnson. 7"snunr. rupta note 130. at 27.
185 .4cridenti on .torzeroa. PA( ISL,%v.)S MOmILY. Oct. 1979. at 23 [hercfinafter cited .t,
.4rctdentI. (; Johnston.. Mtiruru .4c'tdentir. N." PA(.. Nov.-DcC. 1980. at 24 Ihereinafter cited ,s
Johnusn. Mnoruroa).
186 .A'idenir. supra note 185. at 23. Johnson. .fonirurv. swpra note 185. at 24
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environment." 7 A nurse on Mangareva. 150 miles east of Moruroa.
reported an unusual number of miscarriages among women there." '
Given the Utirikese experience, a full assessment of the effects of
French testing probably cannot be made before the end of the decade.
Nevertheless, as journalist Gift Johnson has commented, if the tests are
harmless, it would be in France's favor to publish scientific data show-
ing that no health hazards have yet resulted. As Johnson also noted, no
such data has yet been published.'
In 1981 France announced that it was considering moving its tests
from Polynesia to the Kerguelen Islands in the Indian Ocean. These
islands are near the Australian territories of Heard and McDonald, and
close to international shipping lanes between Cape Town and Perth."'
This will move the tests further away from indigenous Pacific popula-
tions. but memories of the French tests will remain. American testing
caused Pacific islanders to mistrust both anything nuclear and outside
imposition of norms for controlling, or justifying. nuclear pollution.
French testing deepened this mistrust. Japan would soon discover its
intensity.
Ill. TilL .ON[)ON CONVI:NTION AN) TIlE DISPUTE OVER JAIPANE:SE
I DUNiPING PLANS
In 1980 Japan announced plans to dump 10,000 drums of low-level
nuclear wastes in the Pacific at a site 400 miles east of its own Bonin
Islands and 560-600 miles north of the Commonwealth of the Northern
Marianas (CNM). Hoping to avoid the acrimony which accompanied
France's nuclear activities in the Pacific, and displaying greater sensi-
tivity than previous nuclear users of the ocean. Japan sent a team of
officials and scientists to tour various Pacific states and territories to
discuss these plans. They may have hoped for a relaxing South Pacific
junket, as they were going to inform islanders that the Japanese dump-
ing plans complied fully with the London Convention, ' ' a treaty de-
veloped primarily by continent-based powers to legitimate ocean
dumping of nuclear wastes while providing some measure of protection
to the marine environment. Instead, the Japanese team was met with
heated protests which eventually caused Japan to abandon its plans.
I.0 John.on. 7ietwng. supra note 130. at 27. France has recently said that tt would finallv
allow scientists from South Pacific nations to examine the test sites in Polynesia. French Nuclear
Tevste. Washington Post. June 21. 1983. at A15. col. 2.
188 Johnson. Testmg. supra note 130. at 27.
189 Id
190 trance Mar Shift Test Site. Philadelphia Inquirer. December 21. 1981. at 10A. col. 2.
The tests hase not 6et been moved In the meantime. France has tested a neutron bomb on
Moruroa. llernu Frane Te.ted.Veutran Weapon. Washington Post. June 28. 1983. at A9. col. I.
141 Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Waste and Other
Matter. Dec 29. 1972. 26 U S T 2403. T.1 A S. No. 8165.
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A. The London Convention
Radioactive wastes are an unavoidable by-product of the operation
of nuclear power reactors. Disposal of these wastes at sea results in
both environmental hazards and political benefits. The London Con-
vention was an effort to provide a legal regime legitimizing ocean dis-
posal of nuclear wastes, thereby securing the political benefits. while
lessening the environmental hazards.
The hazards associated with ocean dumping of nuclear waste include
those discussed earlier for other means of radiation exposure. Their
effects upon fish include reduction in reproductive capability, morpho-
logical abnormalities, leukopenia. anorexia. lethargy, growth depres-
sion. and hyperactivity.' 9 2 Radioactive wastes are classified as high-
level wastes and low-level wastes. While exact definitions vary, those
terms are fairly self-explanatory. Some high-level wastes may require
isolation from the biosphere for hundreds of thousands of years.'*" and
even certain low-level wastes require isolation for just as long.', 4 Once
these wastes enter the marine food chain, radioactivity will work its
way up the chain to man.' After being dumped in thie ocean, these
wastes cannot be retrieved except at great cost. However, ocean dump-
ing does have one overwhelming political advantage for nuclear pow-
ers. It spares politicians from the political risks involved in choosing a
disposal site within their own territory.
The inadequacies of existing international law in dealing with the
environmental risks became readily apparent. Nations once had abso-
lute freedom to dump radioactive wastes at sea. From 1946-70, the
United States dumped 86,758 containers of low-level wastes into the
ocean. Radioactive leakage from all of the United States dumpsites
has exceeded anticipated levels."9 6 Korea, Japan. and some European
nations have also dumped nuclear wastes in the ocean." 7 The High
Seas Convention limited this freedom, as article 25 required states to
take measures to prevent ocean pollution from radio-active dumping.
taking into account standards and regulations formulated by competent
international organizations. The freedom to dump may also be limited
by the extent to which dumping interferes with article 2's guarantees of
192, Lomio. International Law and Disposal of Radoactive Wastes at Sea. 15 Ni w I:(,. L.
Rp.h. 253. 260 (1979-80).
193. Id at 255 ("at least hundreds of thousands of years"): Note. Disposal of.Vuclear J'arste"
An ,4bdication of Responstbditr? 1979 U. ILL. L.F. 915. 916 ("up to 250.0(X) year%").
194. Lomio. supra note 192. at 256.
195. Id at 260-61.
196. Id at 257.
197. Ilandl, Managing Nuclear Waste. The International Connection. 21 NAT. RI.OUR( 1S J.
268. 300 (1981)
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other freedoms of the high seas.'
Much clearer standards for ocean dumping were developed in 1972
in the London Convention. The treaty applies to all but internal wa-
ters. It generally prohibits ocean dumping of high-level wastes. The
dumping of low-level wastes is permitted. but dumping parties are re-
quired to obtain permits from a contracting state. The state considers
such matters as composition of the waste, the method of disposal. the
impact upon competing ocean uses, availability of alternative land-
based disposal methods, and recommendations of competent interna-
tional bodies in determining whether to issue a permit." ' As of Janu-
ary I. 1982. forty-seven states were parties to the London Convention.
This list included only a handful of Pacific island states-Japan. New
Zealand. Papua New Guinea. and the Phillipines. New Zealand's ac-
ceptance of the Convention did not extend to such affiliated islands as
the Cook Islands. Niue. and Tokelau.
J. Paul Lomio. a Washington attorney, saw many weaknesses in the
London Convention. It allows dumping of high-level wastes in exigent
circumstances. While contracting parties are required to prevent and
punish violations, exceptions are made for violators entitled to sover-
eign immunity under international law. Lomio also foresaw the crea-
tion of "pollution havens" which would issue permits with all the care
currently shown in the licensing procedures of flag of convenience
states.2 5 '
Gunther Handl. Alexander V. Humboldt Fellow at the Max Plank
Institute. felt that the London Convention was strengthened by the Or-
ganization for Economic Co-Operation and Development Council de-
cision establishing a multilateral consultation and surveyance
mechanism for sea dumping of radioactive wastes.2"I Daniel P. Finn.
Research Fellow at the Woods Hole Oceanographic Institution. noted
that the London Convention was tightened up by International Atomic
Energy Agency recommendations.'12  Both of these actions narrowed
loopholes in the Convention by providing for more specific standards
and greater international supervision.
Some issues remained unsolved by the London Convention. While it
prohibited dumping high-level wastes "at sea." it is unclear whether or
198 See supa note 139 and accompanying text
399. Summary adapted from Ffandl.mpa note 197. at 306. Although the particular dispute itO
be discussed here involved low-level wastes, those portions of the Convention dealing with high-
level waste.% will also be discussed. It can be assumed that Pacific islanders who opposed ocean
dumping of low-lesl wastes would similarly oppose ocean dumping of high-level wastes.
20(0 Lomio. rupra note 192. at 271.
201 flandl. rupta note 197. at 308 (discussing OECD l)oc C(77).115 (Final). reported in 17
lti Lit, M%'Ls 445 (197X)).
202 Finn. Ocean Disposal uf Radioactiti H'aste: The Ohhgaiwn o/ (uoperallon 10 PItecilhe
,lanne i'nwronmrnt. 21 VA. J. Isr' L. 621. 651 (1981)
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not the disposal of high-level wastes in the sub-seabed or emplacement
in deep geological formations constitute disposal "'at sea." These ap-
pear to be among the safest alternatives for high-level wastes. How-
ever, as Elisabeth Mann Borgese. a Senior Fellow at the Center for the
Study of Democratic Institutions, commented, -l]t may well be the
safest place on earth. . . . Surely something will go wrong sometime.
somewhere-while the radioactive waste is shipborne, or during its
burial-and the consequences will be apocalyptic." 2 I If something did
go wrong. retrieval of wastes from these sites could be prohibitively
difficult and expensive.
The recent Convention on the Law of the Sea2'" will probably have a
minimal effect in this area, and therefore will neither provide much
support to the Pacific Islanders' position regarding nuclear dumping.
nor serve as an adequate framework within which to address this issue.
The treaty contains no specific references to the handling or disposal of
radioactive wastes. George D. Haimbaugh. Jr., Professor of Law at the
University of South Carolina. said that delegates to the Conference ex-
plained to him that this was because the subject was already covered by
the London Convention.2t' However, he believed that many existing
treaties would be inferentially reinforced by several Law of' the Sea
treaty provisions. Those provisions include article 194. obligating
states to take measures to prevent, reduce, and control marine pollu-
tion: article 210. requiring that states regulate dumping and calling for
global and regional standards: article 216, prescribing responsibility for
the enforcement of dumping regulations: and article 237, regarding ex-
isting conventions." In addition to reinforcing other treaties, the Law
of the Sea Convention may attract signatories which have not yet
signed. or observed, these other treaties. Haimbaugh also noted that
the Law of the Sea Convention is "suffused with additional sugges-
tions" that states act singly or cooperatively for the "conservation of the
living resources of the sea," "the protection and preservation of the
marine environment." and, "the prevention, reduction and control of
pollution." ' 7 However, the inferential limitations on ocean dumping
in the Law of the Sea Convention may have little practical impact. At
the time of this writing, some nuclear powers. including the United
States, were not parties to the Convention.
203 E. Bomn,tsi-. Tit-. DRAMA 0- T1it- O i-..AN 213 (1974). quotedin Lonio. supra note 192. at
28~5-86.
204 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. Third United Nations Conference on
the Law of the Sea. Dist. GENERAL. A/CONF. 62/122. 7 October 19K2 Ihereinafter cited as
LOSI
205 I'lainbaugh. Protecting the Seas F),om Nuclear Pollution. 33 S.C L Ri.v 197. 207 n 62
( 19X2)
206 Id at 224-25.
217 Id at 210
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The most important provisions of this treaty in regard to nuclear pol-
lution may be buried in those sections dealing with the International
Sea-Bed Authority and its control over the seabed, ocean floor, and
sub-soil beyond national jurisdiction. 2°8 The extent to which these pro-
visions give the Authority control over nuclear waste disposal on or
beneath the seabed, and the extent to which this control will be mean-
ingful without United States acquiescence to the Convention. cannot be
determined at this time.
B. The Dispute Over Japanese Dumping Plans
The Japanese delegation set off, armed with the London Convention.
to explain its nation's dumping plans. It was not always greeted with
traditional Pacific island hospitality. When the delegation met with is-
land officials at the Second Annual Conference of the Association of
Pacific Island Chief Executives on Guam. a regional magazine de-
scribed the event as "Japanese Road Show Panned in Guam." ' (N Gov-
ernor Paul Calvo of Guam expressed concern over health and
environmental hazards. Tosiwo Nakamura. Speaker of the Palau Leg-
islature, brought up the legacy of Bikini and claimed that any dumping
accidents would create both real and perceived risks to fishing and
tourism in Palau.2t0 Governor Carlos Comacho of the CNM stated
that only three Pacific nations-New Zealand, Papua New Guinea.
and the Phillipines-were parties to the London Convention. Gover-
nor Erhart Aten of Truk asked for a show of hands as to who opposed
the dumping: the hands of all those present except the Japanese went
up. Eight of the ten island leaders present signed a resolution opposing
nuclear waste dumping. and copies were sent to the United States Pres-
ident, the Japanese Prime Minister, and the United Nations Secretary-
General.
The team's South Pacific tour did not get more idyllic when it left
Guam. In Western Samoa, their breakfast was interrupted by women
parading through the hotel dining room with signs ranging from "Join
the Nuclear Family and Have Funny Children" to a simple "NO."
Prime Minister Tupola Efi was "too busy" to meet the team.'' One
week before the delegation reached Tuvalu. the parliament there
20X .Vee. eg. LOS. supra note 204. arts. 157. 209. 215.
209 Lichncr. Fice-Off Over Nuclear Dumping in PuF'or--apanese Road Shoh Panne'd in
Guam. Ni w P^E.. Nov.-Dec. 1980. at 10.
210 Nakamura is probably correct in assuming that even *'perceived risks" of a "safe" level of
radioactIv11% will have a disastrous effect on fishing and tourism. After the Bravo tcst. American
lniporters refused to buy fish from Japan even when those fish met official U.S. safety standards.
R L.kI'P. upra note 35. at 129
211 Afamasaga. Samoan Women Ilave No Yen For Japanese Vuclear *site. Ni.w P.%(
Nov .)cc 1980. at 13
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passed a resolution giving "full support to efforts the Tuvalu govern-
ment is exerting now and in the future to prevent anyone dumping nu-
clear wastes of any description anywhere in the Pacific Ocean. - ' 2
Protests escalated. The legislatures of Palau. CNM. and Federated
States of Micronesia (FSM) also passed resolutions opposing the
dumping plans.2 *' Island leaders discussed a possible boycott of Japa-
nese goods.21 ' The CNM considered excluding Japanese vessels from
its fishing zone if the dumping went ahead.215 The governments of
American Samoa. Hawaii. New Zealand. and Papua-New Guinea
joined the protests.2 "
Japan had justified the plan on the grounds that the dumping site
was closer to Bonin than to any foreign territory.2 1 This rare Japanese
acceptance of the equidistance principle in the law of the sea was some-
what deflated when people on Bonin added their voices to the pro-
tests.2 " In the spring of 1981. Japan postponed its dumping plans "due
to lack of funds.":'" On October 22. 1981 the Japanese Energy Council
announced that it would review the dumping plans and explore ways to
dispose of low-level wastes on sites near the plant which produced
them.22"
The Japanese dumping dispute illustrates how Pacilic islanders are
gaining increasing influence over international law regarding nuclear
pollution of the ocean. The complaints of the Marshallese had little
effect on American testing, although the data gathered from them prob-
ably helped bring about the Test Ban Treaty. The adverse publicity the
United States received from their plight, and the costs of compensation.
medical care. and island decontamination efforts have hopefully led to
greater caution in nuclear testing. Pacific protests together with the
legal maneuvers of Australia and New Zealand were pivotal in forcing
French tests to go underground. These actions also pushed the Test
Ban Treaty a step closer to the status of customary international law.
They may have established norms of international law against atmo.s-
pheric or surface testing outside a nation's own territory, and against
tests which cause a significant amount of harm outside a nation's own
territory. Finally, in the Japanese dumping controversy, a coalition
composed primarily of micro-states and non-independent territories
212 uisalu RIG,,ter% .Nuilea. Prtest. N1, P-t . No% --)et. 1980. at 33
213 Kent. Detu.ing ihe Danirr 'ac'-c .Vulear Free Zone. Ni %x Pm . No% -Icc 19,0. 1i "2.
33
214 Quamb%. lloprful S n% in .udear Dumping lrues. .i .ian-i %. Winter 19.1. at 17. 1S
215 hnn. supra note 202. at h22 n 7
216 Id at 666 n7.
217 bichner. supra note 209. at 11)
211( See Quirnb%. tupra n.tc 21-3. at 17
219..Veasgram. Ni.% Pt . March-April 191,. at 00
221). Qusmbi.si.pra note 214-. at 17-18
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may have prevented larger powers from dictating norms of interna-
tional law which would permit radioactive dumping through the
London Convention.
The policy of developed nations, when faced with demands from the
Third World which affect their economic and military interests, has
been that for any principle or treaty provision to become cus(omarv
international law. it must have widespread and representative accept-
ance without any significant protest from states affected by application
of the principle. 2' As Governor Camacho implied, the nations and
territories which would be most affected by nuclear pollution in the
Pacific are now prepared to follow this policy.222 and are insisting that
those nations which profit from nuclear activity must themselves as-
sume the risks associated with nuclear by-products.22-'
IV. POSSIBLE AREAS OF FUTURE DISPUTES
Anti-nuclear actions and demands in the Pacific have gone beyond
those discussed above. These actions include constitutional provisions
designed to control the testing. storage. use, and disposal of radioactive
materials within the jurisdiction of Pacific states.224 a United Nations
resolution endorsing the establishment of a nuclear weapon-free zone
in the South Pacific.225 recent official statements of opposition to nu-
clear waste disposal in the oceans.22" and grass-roots Nuclear Free Pa-
221 Ilaimbaugh. tupra note 205. at 222
222 S;r l:ichner. supru note 20J. at 10
223 Kent. .upra note 213. at 31 (quoting Camacho speech to U N. Trustecship Council).
224 S"e' I- SM Co'.%s art XIII. § 2. repnied in 2 T.T Col)l 317 (1980). Rt 'itlOt, IiO
PSI tt ( t.%i art XII. § 6. repqin'dtn 2 T T Ctot)i 437 11981).
I he I- S .i prosision provide. "Radioactive. toxic chemical. or other harmful substance% mas
not be tCsted. stored. used, or disposed o" within the jurisdiction of the :ederated States of" Mlcro-
ncia '%ithout the espress approsal of the national gocrnment of the Federated States o .Micronc-
Ihe Palau proision states. "'llarmful sublances such as nuclear, chemical. gas or biological
'eafpon intended lor use in s.arfare. nuclear po,.cr plants, and waste materials therefrom. shall
not be uscd, teted. lorcd or disioed of sithin the territorial jurisdiction of Palau %%ithout the
expre,, approal of three-f'ourths of the ,otes cast in a referendum submitted on this specific
quetion "" In a recent relerendum held puruant to this constitutional requirement. Palauan vot-
ers rejected a proposal to allow United States nuclear-powered and nuclear-armed ships access it
their territo r b a margin of 51 V7, against to 4 V-, for B "or Put. Status ''a't/ir lehi ReItuni
IMth l'. in lvuht. N Y Times. Feb 13. 1983. at i0. col I.
.eS;ai,, Ri ' t it toi Ptl tt '%st an. 11. § 3. r-prrniedrn 2 T.T Cit)t 426 119l0) (govern-
mental potcrs including defcnse may be delegated by treaty or compact to another nation, if'such
ireat% or compact authorizes use., testing. storage. or disposal of nuclear weapons it must be ap-
procd h, threc-hounhs of vote% cast in referendum).
225 X'e Kent. izipra note 213. at 32. The resolution. No 3477. was passed on I)ec II. 1975
h a %itcf I 10-i Twenty nations., including the L' S. U.S S.R. U.K.. and France. abtained.
22.1 M)croncsian Washington Otlice of the I-ederated States of Micronesia. News Release
tOcwober 21). 9X21 (quoting speech by FSNI President Tosiwo Nakayama. reaffirming his govern-
ment's opposition to the dumping of nuclear and other toxic wastes in the ocean, and its policy of
precluding ,uch Jumping in the I-S.M' 2KBI-mile economic zone).
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cific Conferences. 2" These activities may lead to further disputes
between Pacific islanders and nuclear powers.
With the United States and USSR increasingly relying on nuclear-
powered vessels in their navies, and the possibility of nuclear-powered
merchant ships, legal norms relating to such vessels could become the
focus of a future dispute. Shortly after the United States Navy began
using such vessels. Naval legal commentators proclaimed their safety.
Captain Leonard R. Hardy stated that nuclear ships can be designed,
built, and operated in a manner which would pose no significant haz-
ard to man or the environment. He stated that the nature of the fuel
element in the reactor is such that it cannot become an atom bomb. and
said that "except in a collision" the effects of a nuclear accident would
be confined to the ship itself.2 " LCDR James H. Doyle noted that data
from nuclear ships in operation revealed that while such ships do have
some radioactive discharge, the level of radioactivity is low and has
practically no effect on the environment. 22'
The optimistic comments from the United States military regarding
nuclear vessels have turned out to be far more accurate than similar
comments about nuclear tests. However. some commentators point out
potential problems. One noted that land-based nuclear reactors are not
likely to be involved in a collision, run aground on a reef, or carry
explosives. 3t" William H. Berman and Lee M. Hydeman, co-directors
of the University of Michigan Law School Atomic Energy Research
Project, claimed that if an accident did occur, release of fission materi-
als from a ship's power plant could cause almost immediate widespread
damage to shore areas within a radius of fifty miles. with contamina-
tion of sea resources extending over a greater area.33 '
Two major treaties deal with nuclear vessels. The first is SOLAS.2' -
which applies only to merchant vessels. Under SOLAS. a flag state
must approve the design. construction, and inspection standards for re-
actors. It must develop operating manuals and conduct surveys of radi-
ation safety to insure there are no unreasonable hazards to crew.
passengers, the public, waterways, and marine resources. Flag states
should make safety assessments available to potential port states, which
227 Kent. ,pra note 213. at 36. Conferences were held in Fiji in 1975. Ponape in 1978. md
flonolulu in 1981
22, lIard). The.4tom at Sea- International Law and Nuclear Shipping. JAG J.. April 1959. .ai
9. 10
229 lowdc. supra note 123. at 32. .4ccord Finn. supra note 202. at 671.
231) .Nulear.Po ered .Merchant Ship5. 229 L. TM,.s 249. 249 (1960).
231 Berman & Ilydcman. International Control of the Safetr of Nuclear Powered .Iechani
Shtps. 59 Mlt i L RL.v. 233. 241 (1960).
232. International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea. June 10. 1948. T.1 A S No. 2495.
164 U.N T.S 113. as amended bp INTERNATIONAL CONIIu.RENC1. O% SAI I. r ot Lia.%[r SI.A.
IMCO I)tx No. IMCO/SAFC'N/25/Rev. I (190).
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have the right to refuse entry. '3" The other major treaty is the Brussels
Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships.23 4 The
Brussels Convention covers all ships with nuclear power plants. It
came about because of fears that the aggregate claims arising from a
large scale nuclear incident could exceed the existing resources of the
insurance industry.2" This Convention provides that the ship owner
has absolute liability, with exceptions only for sabotage, war, and in-
surrection. A licensed owner's liability is limited to $100 million for
each vessel in a single incident. There is no limitation on the liability
of an unlicensed owner. If a flag state does not take all measures neces-
sary to compel an operator to become licensed, the flag state risks lia-
bility of up to $100 million. A statute of limitations is set at ten years
from the date of an incident. Jurisdiction rests in either the licensing
state or the state where the damage occurs, except in the case of war-
ships where jurisdiction lies only with the flag state.2 'a
Nuclear vessels are also dealt with briefly in the Law of the Sea Con-
vention. Articles 22 and 23 limit the right of innocent passage through
territorial seas by nuclear-powered ships and ships carrying nuclear
materials. Coastal states may confine their passage to designated sea
lanes. These vessels must carry documents and observe special precau-
tionary measures established by international agreements.
There are many reasons why these treaties might not provide ade-
quate reassurance to Pacific islanders. Berman and Hydeman felt that
SOLAS leaves much to be desired. They noted that many port states
would be unable to assess the required technical reports.," certainly a
likely problem for Pacific microstates. They further commented that
port states have to rely on a flag state's good faith, a problem with flag
of convenience states which are probably not equipped to evaluate re-
actor safety.2-H They also noted that a port state's right to exclude un-
safe nuclear vessels offers little protection given the possible range of a
233 Summary of SOLAS adapted from Berman &I lvdeman. supra note 231. at 239-40.
234 Brussels Convention on the Liability of Operators of Nuclear Ships of 25 May 1962. For
text. sce the following: International Conventions of Civil Liability for Nuclear Damage. IAEA
Legal Series No. 4. at 36-46 (Vienna. 1966); 4 PRo(.at.ss IN NUCLI-.AR Esi-R(;Y. Series X app I
(1966)
235 Note. The /t062 Brussels Convenion on the Liabiitr ofOperators o(.Vueear Shipr. 57 A i
J ISTr' 1.. 1W. 101 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Note. Brussels Conventi'ni.
236. Summary of treaty provisions adapted from Hardy. The L'abiliti of Operaur.s t.f.Vu'lear
Ships. 12 INT & Cosip. L.Q. 778 (1963): Szasz. The Conrention on the Liabihty of Operators f
,Vue/ear Ships. 2 J. MAR. L. & Com. 541 (1971).
237 Berman & ilydeman. supra note 231. at 242-43. Contra Ilardy. .rpra note 228. at I I
flardy claimed that with the technical data being published, physicists. engineers, and ship design-
ers in all port states will be able to evaluate this type of data- lie did not say where all the
microstates in the Pacific. many of which admittedly did not exist when he made his comment.%.
would acquire physicists. engineers, and ship designers.
23$. Berman & lHydeman..supra note 231. at 242-43.
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nuclear accident.239
Berman and Hydeman suggest that coastal states be given the right
to inspect reactors on nuclear vessels. 2  However, as LCDR William
R. St. George notes. this will never come about for military vessels.
For reasons of military secrecy, they "cannot be laid bare to public or
foreign government scrutiny as is suggested . . . for merchant ships.
They must be accepted, if they are to be accepted at all, solely on the
basis of their reputation as safe ships and on confidence in the Navy
which built and operates them."24 ' This creates a dilemma for Pacific
islanders, who must weigh the safety record of American nuclear ves-
sels and the strong residual good will the United States Navy earned by
liberating their islands from the Japanese against the record of United
States nuclear operations in the Pacific when considered as a whole.
There are also problems with the Brussels Convention. The $100
million limitation could be insufficient to cover actual damages. Re-
covery could be further limited in a flag state court it' there were a
residual notion that "life is cheap" in non-Western areas. In many flag
states, recovery for the wrongful death of a Marshallese who provided
for all of his extended family's needs through subsistence fishing and
agriculture would be much less than recovery for the wrongful death of
a local wage-earner whose salary could not provide for his nuclear
family. As the Marshallese example showed, the ten-year statute of
limitations is inadequate to cover many effects of radiation exposure.
The Marshallese experience also indicates, without attributing these
motives to the United States, that a nation powerful enough to cause a
nuclear mishap may have the power to isolate potential plaintiffs in
locations so remote that they would have no access to courts, or mis-
lead them with optimistic medical reports, for more than ten years.
Furthermore, it could be difficult for a claimant to establish causa-
tion. 4 - For example, given that the miscarriage rate of exposed
Rongelapese women doubled, any individual claimant could only
prove that there was a fifty-fifty chance that her miscarriage was caused
by nuclear radiation.
The most significant shortcoming of the Brussels Convention is that
it was not ratified by either the United States or the USSR. The rea-
sons given by each illustrate how the Soviets score propaganda victo-
ries on nuclear issues even when their actual behavior is identical to
that of the United States. The United States claimed that responsibility
239. Id. at 242-43.
240. Id at 253.
241. St. George./nternattonal Openrtonal Regulations and ihe ,Vular-Po ¢eedSh'pr. JAC J.
April 1959. at 20. 24
242 Cf Si.zsz. supfra note 236. at 560 (di.cuing proof of causation problcms rclating to
harmful effects of radiation that do not bccom" known within 10 ycar).
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for damages caused by warships was not a matter for civil law. but
rather for public international law. The Russians claimed that by lim-
iting state responsibility in accidents caused by warships. the Conven-
tion legalized the use of nuclear energy for purposes of war.2 -'4
Most Pacific island nations have accepted the Law of the Sea Con-
vention. although it does not solve all of the problems attributed to
SOLAS by Hydeman and Berman. This acceptance may reflect a
trade-off, as Pacific states will benefit from other provisions of this
treaty. such as those creating a 200-mile exclusive economic zone.2 "
However. this treaty shares one shortcoming with the Brussels Conven-
tion. A major nuclear power. the United States. is not a party. In
short, existing international law regarding nuclear vessels contains
many loopholes which could cause Pacific islanders to believe that their
interests are not adequately protected.
Floating nuclear power plants are another possible source of future
conflict, though none have yet been constructed. Marlow J. Blake.
President of the Environmental Law Society at the University of
Miami. noted that existing plans would place them within territorial
seas.2 4 5 Admiral Max K. Morris. Professor of International Business at
the University of North Florida at Jacksonville. and John W. Kindt.
Associate Professor of Graduate Business Law at the University of Illi-
nois. claimed that no norm of international law flatly prohibits, or per-
mits. construction of such plants in a contiguous zone, economic zone.
or on the high seas.2" ' Blake stated that with adequate retrieval plans
and on-shore disposal of wastes, it might be possible to design and lo-
cate a plant so that it would have almost no perceptible effects beyond
national jurisdiction-barring a disaster such as a collision, design de-
fect, war. or act of God.247 Morris and Kindt noted that plants have
potential problems with thermal discharge and perimeter contamina-
tion, while a small irradiation accident could cause Trail Smeller type
injuries to another country's fish supply leading to enormous recover-
able damages. 24  Borgese stated that if a floating plant had an acci-
dent. it could release enough strontium-90, a leukemia-causing agent,
to contaminate thousands of cubic miles of water. She also observed
that the thousands of cubic miles of contaminated water might fail to
243. Note. Brussels Convention. rupra note 235. at 109.
244 See generally LOS. supra note 204. arts. 55-75.
245. Blake. floating Vuclear Power Plants-.4 "Reasonble" Vse (fythe Iligh Seas. 8 CAL. W.
Ir't L.J 191. 192 (1978).
246 Morris & Kindt. The Law afthe Sea. Domestic and International (ontriderations .4rsinmg
ftom the Classfcation of f oating Vuclear Poer Plants and Their Breakwaters a .4rttpcwl l.rlandr.
19 V.A I INr'. L. 299. 310-13 (1979).
247 Blake. mupra note 245. at 194
248. Morns & Kindt. supra note 245. at 308-.9
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respect the boundaries of territorial seas. 4"  While existing plans call
for floating plants capable of withstanding the greatest wind and waves
experienced in the past century. Borgese asks, -What if the wind and
waves are greater this century than last?' :25°
Given the possible effects on their migratory tuna supplies. Pacific
islanders are likely to oppose floating nuclear power plants. However.
Blake suggested that states might try to justify plant construction under
a McDougal-Schlei balancing test on the theory that dependence on
foreign energy sources jeopardizes national security. 25:
There are other possible sources of future conflict. Borgese noted
that no existing law or norm would prohibit undersea military stations
powered by nuclear reactors. 25 2 Dr. John Craven. Dean of Marine
Studies at the University of Hawaii and a designer of the United States
Navy's Poseidon system. stated the following:
ITihe concept of sea-based strategic deterrence which appears to have
been adopted in whole or in part by the governments of France. Brit-
ain. the U.S.S.R.. and the U.S.. is not compatible with the notion of a
denuclearized ocean. It is thus now generally recognized that the
Treatv to Prohibit Emplacement of Weapons of Mass Destruction on
the Seabed and Ocean Floor is more symbolic than substantive. This is
particularly true since it is as easy. or easier, to design systems that float
about the ocean floor as it is to design systems fixed to the ocean
floor.2 5
This need for a sea-based deterrent is already leading to conflict.
Vanuatu and Fiji have closed their ports to United States Navy war-
ships because, pursuant to Pentagon policies, the United States will not
give assurances that the ships do not carry nuclear weapons.2 '5 4
There are two major barriers to islanders' anti-nuclear efforts. The
first is economic. Many Pacific states and territories are economically
dependent on their former or current administrators. It is possible that
anti-nuclear demands will yield to either offers of aid or threats to re-
duce aid. It had been claimed that United States policy in Micronesia
was intentionally designed to replace a self-sufficient subsistence econ-
249 E BOR(,-. Tilt DRAMA 01 TilL OCLANS 212 (1975)
25 Id at 212 Writing three -e.ars later. Blake was more optimistic, lie claim.% the plant wail
hac the capacitv to withstand sustained winds of 300 miles per hour, a collision with an,
•upcr,cs.cI afloat, and the greatest wave cstimated to occur within the next ten thousand .car%
Blake. iupru note 245. at 192 (citing U.S. DiEPr. ot COwIi.( II. (NOAA). Ri.PoRr To Till ('t%-
(,Rt S 0% O(t IN POLLUTION. OVi.-FistiIN( AND OrtioiRt Di.VI:LOPMiLNT. JULY 1973-Jt %i
1974. at 60 (1975)
251 Blake. supra note 245. at 204. 207.
252 E BOR;I... supra note 249. at 188.
253 Cras.en. .4 Iegal Regime for Arms Control and Pollution Control in the Oceans, in Tilt
Titit so ('t %%(,a 100. 103 (E. Borgese & D. Krieger ed 1975)
254 Trumbull. Pactfic.4olls.ShowFestI. Independence. N.Y Times. Oct. 24. 1982. § 4 Wcek
in Review),. at 2E. col. 3.
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omy with a welfare state dependent on United States aid to insure Mi-
cronesian compliance with United States security demands.:::
However. islanders cannot always be bought off. The Foillard-Leo
family purchased Palmyra Atoll in Hawaii for $15.000 in 1922.'
They refused a recent United States government offer of S18 million for
the atoll because of government plans to use it as a nuclear waste
dump. Dudley Fullard-Leo noted that the atoll's corrosive climate
made it difficult to store anything there, while its waters feed three
equatorial currents rich in tuna and other edible fish. 2 7
The second barrier that Pacific islanders face is the theory that inter-
national law can be ignored (or. as the Brezhnev doctrine illustrates.
rewritten) when "supreme interests" are jeopardized.2 "" The standards
for determining what constitutes a supreme interest vary, and perver-
sions of this theory and McDougal and Schlei's theories could encom-
pass almost any nuclear activity. If superpowers reduce international
law to a "pure power 25' theory test of strength. most Pacific micro-
states lack the power to protect their own supreme interests against ac-
tual or threatened gunboat diplomacy.
There are good reasons for the United States and its allies to avoid
this heavy-handed alternative. As a result of having experienced occu-
pation by a totalitarian power. and having been liberated by the United
States, most Pacific states tilt strongly towards the United States and
away from the U.S.S.R. in their foreign (or in the case of United States
territories, quasi-foreign) policies. They generally support the United
States in the United Nations. refuse Soviet economic aid, and reject
Soviet requests for resident diplomatic representation. 2t) However, as
Dwight Heine, a Marshallese who has been a Trust Territory official
and Pauling plaintiff, noted, United States nuclear activities in the
Marshalls caused many Marshallese to forget initial United States ac-
complishments in health and education as "the residual image of 'Lib-
erator' faded away and the facsimile of 'oppressors' zoomed into
prominence. "'61 A successful effort at forcing one Pacific state to, for
example. accept nuclear wastes may open up a port for Russian war-
255 Tiflin. rupra note 38. Contra D. NvIN. THE AMERI(AN Tou(-ii IN MIuf'oRN!is% 30
11977) (condition of Micronesian economy is result of U.S. incompetence, not conspirac)).
256 Thomas. supra note 94. at 30.
257. Refusa/on Palnnra. PAC. ISLANDS MONTHLY. Oct. 1979. at 23. 23.
258 See generallr J. SWEENEY. C. OLIVER & N. LEECl. supra note 157. at 83-84 (quoting B
Tt( IMIAN. TIlE GuNs OF AUGUST 127 (1962)).
259. "ee generalii J. SwE.NEY. C. OLIVER & N. L..cui. supra note 157. at 1222 (quoting
McDougal. Internation Law. Power and Polity; A Contemporar; Concepiton. I Academic de Droit
International. Recucil des Courts 137 (1953)).
260 Trumbull..iupra note 254, at E2. col. 3.
261 D. loine. supra note 82. at 29.
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ships elsewhere. -' 2
The days when continent-based nuclear powers could dictate norms
of international law regarding nuclear pollution to Pacific islanders are
waning, if not over. In the future it will be necessary to include Pacific
nations and territories in the law-making processes to avoid the type of
reaction which sank Japanese dumping plans and undermined the
London Convention.
Pacific Islanders will bring a deep mistrust of anything nuclear to the
bargaining table. Almira Matayoshi. a Rongelapese woman who was
eighteen years old when caught in the Bravo snow storm, has lost four
children at birth. In a 1980 interview she claimed. -The people who
are testing don't care about people on Rongelap and did not care then.
I will not forget what happened to the people of Rongelap."I - As
Pearl Buck stated in discussing the Japanese reaction to the fate of the
Japanese fishermen caught in Bravo's fallout. -Time and eflort . . .
have not erased memories. These are permanent. And permanent
memories have a way of erupting .... ."2 While the Western powers
cannot erase these memories, they can take certain actions which could
convince Pacific islanders of their current good faith. These include the
following: allowing independent scientific and medical investigations
of places and persons exposed to fallout:265 settling radiation-related
claims through an impartial claims commission after receiving the re-
ports of these independent investigations, rather than through haphaz-
ard legislation or negotiations between parties of grossly unequal
bargaining power: and establishment of a fund to compensate future
victims of lingering radiation. genetic defects, and homelessness. Na-
tions under the umbrella of United States nuclear protection which did
not share the radioactive costs of nuclear testing could contribute to the
compensation. The same could be done by nations under the umbrella
of France's nuclear protection, if there are any. Given general attitudes
in the Pacific about the United States and Russia. proof that Western
powers will make good faith efforts to avoid any further nuclear mis-
haps and to atone for any which do occur is likely to result in good
262 Rccent, Vanuatu said it vtould permit Soviet warships to use its ports. while F'iji %,aid it
%%.ts reviewing a ban it imposed on all Soviet ships after the invasion of Afghanistan. Trumbull.
,utlra note 254. at 2. col 5 These actions appear to be a result of disagreement with the Western
ho. on a sariet of issues. including nuclear issues. Perhaps Vanuatu feels that b- rcl ing solels
on one side in superpower conflict. it leaves itself unable to resist any of that side's pxlictes and
demands While this is clearly a minority view in the Pacific. if western demands for nuclear u.es
of the ocean are viewed as excessive, other Pacific states might try to protect their interests b,
plasing off the two superpowers against each other,
263 I I. W.sst RtAN & N. SoLtoN. supra note 44. at 86-87.
264 Buck. Foreword to R. LAPP. supra note 35. at xi-xii.
26S \lthough this crcates the possibility that some of the information discoscred could be
leiked. leaks at this late date will probably not be of great help to the Soviets. lB% nov% the'% hate
h.id the oppkirtunitN to gather similar data front their test sites in their own counitry
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faith efforts by islanders to accommodate truly legitimate Western se-
curity needs.
V. CONCLUSION
In 1947 Albert Einstein compared the discovery of nuclear fission to
the discovery of fire. Reporters Harvey Wasserman and Norman Solo-
mon commented that Einstein failed to note how long it took primitive
human society to control that fire.266 Wasserman and Solomon failed
to note that even now there are still accidental fires and arson. Pacific
islanders have been convinced that not only has modern human society
not yet learned to control the nuclear fire, but that certain segments of
this society are not concerned about controlling nuclear fires so long as
they are ignited thousands of miles away.
Early norms of international law dealing with this fire were devel-
oped by a handful of powerful nations. These norms stressed "reason-
ableness" and "balancing of interests," but were used to justify
activities that were definitely careless and probably neither reasonable
nor balanced. As the victims of nuclear activities gained an increasing
say about affairs in their ocean, they asserted themselves in an effort to
revise the norms which had jeopardized their health and their home-
lands. In some cases they sought new norms which would preserve
their own legitimate interests, many of which would benefit all man-
kind. However, if there are nuclear uses of the ocean which would be
reasonable under the normal definition of the word, rather than just
under a McDougal-Schlei balancing test, nuclear powers will have to
shoulder a heavy burden of proof to gain Pacific acceptance of these
uses.
One Pacific writer has summarized the situation as follows:
The prevailing view appears to be that if one can find something in
international law that does not flatly prohibit an action, then that action
is not only legal. it is right.26 7 However. . . . it is plain that there are a
great many declarations, resolutions, and official and unofficial state-
ments which show very clearly the depth and breadth of opposition to
the nuclearization of the Pacific. These, too. are sources of interna-
tional law.
Nuclear activities raise profound issues of justice-and of survival.
Present formal international law remains a weak and incomplete basis
266. Ht WASSERMAN & N. SOLOMON. supra note 44. at 269.
267 See general?), M. McDoUoAL & W. BURKE. supra note 124. at 791 (*We have alread)
re ewed the tentative organized Iinternationall community response to this claim . . . [of access
to the ocean for nuclear testing] . . . and noted the failure to agree on prescriptions absolutely
forbidding this new use."): Judicial Silence. supra note 152. at 631 ("'Tlhe French government
inasted that the dispute was purely political because there is no rule of international law which
prohibits atmospheric testing as the only existing norm ....") Ifootnote added].
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of doctrine. one far too narrow to use as a basis for deciding such fun-
damental questions. If international law is to be used. it should be evi-
dent. given the enormous diversity of views, that what is needed is the
creation of new law, law based on sustained dialogue among all those
concerned. 2"
SETH FORMAN*
268 Kent. svpra note 213. at 36
"(lass of 1983. Duke Un',ersity School of Law: Peace Corps Volunteer. Mticron-,ta. 1978-
1980 Admitted to D.C Bar. 1983.
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